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APPRENDES LIMITS
R. Craig Green *
I. INTRODUCTION
Sentencing law has undergone a significant transformation,
and although that change once drew spare attention, at issue is
nothing less than the jury's constitutional role. The Sixth
Amendment grants criminal defendants the right to a jury trial,1
but the Constitution does not explain what its terms mean, nor
does it explicitly limit nonjury actors' authority at sentencing, af-
ter the jury's guilty verdict issues. In recent years, the Supreme
Court of the United States has repeatedly analyzed how constitu-
tional trial rights should apply to sentencing procedures, but pub-
lic scrutiny of those decisions was limited until Blakely v. Wash-
ington,2 which one scholar heralded as "the biggest criminal
justice decision not just of this past term [2003],... but perhaps
in the history of the Supreme Court."3
One reason Blakely spurred such excitement is a popular con-
sensus that the decision virtually required the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines ("Guidelines") to be held unconstitutional,4 thereby
* Assistant Professor, Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law; J.D.,
1999, Yale Law School; B.S., 1996, Wake Forest University. Special thanks to Douglas A.
Berman, Stephanos Bibas, Toby Heytens, David A. Hoffman, James Shellenberger, and
Neil S. Siegel, who commented on earlier drafts, and to Ahilan Arulanantham. Many
thanks also to Kathryn Davidson for thorough and prompt research assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
2. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
3. Douglas Berman, Supreme Court Cleanup in Aisle 4: Blakely Is Too Big and Messy
to Ignore, SLATE, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2104014 (July 16, 2004) (last visited Apr. 2,
2005); see also Benjamin Wittes, The Law of Suspended Sentencing, THE ATLANTIC, Oct.
2004, at 50-53 (describing Blakely as "the single most irresponsible decision in the modern
history of the Supreme Court").
4. See supra note 3; see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, To Sever or Not to Sever? Why
Blakely Requires Action by Congress, 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 11 (2004); Rachel E.
Barkow, The Devil You Know: Federal Sentencing After Blakely, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP.
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undermining thousands of federal sentences and substantially al-
tering vital details of how federal criminal law works. This Article
challenges that consensus as incomplete. My first step is to dem-
onstrate that the principles set forth in Blakely do not undermine
the Guidelines. Unlike Blakely, two cases pending before the
Court address the Guidelines' constitutionality,5 and although I
will not predict how they might be decided, those cases confront
the Court with important constitutional questions that have not
been answered by Blakely or any of its predecessors.
This Article also offers an argument from constitutional princi-
ple for upholding the Guidelines. After analyzing two contrary
theories of the Sixth Amendment, I suggest that the Court should
not strike down the Guidelines because they do not impose any
312 (2004); Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 333
(2004); Steven L. Chanenson, Hoist with Their Own Petard?, 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 20
(2004); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 316
(2004); Larry Kupers, Proposal for a Viable Federal Sentencing Scheme in the Wake of
Blakely v. Washington, 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 28 (2004); Memorandum from Frank
Bowman to United States Sentencing Commission, Memorandum Presenting a Proposal
for Bringing the Guidelines into Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, reprinted in 16
FED. SENTENCING REP. 364 (2004); Mark Osler, The Blakely Problem and the 3x Solution,
16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 344 (2004); Aaron Rappaport, What the Supreme Court Should
Do: Save Sentencing Reform, Gut the Guidelines, 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 46 (2004); Jon
Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington Practical Implica-
tions for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 60 (2004); Joan Biskupic,
High Court Ruling Sows Confusion; Decision Has Cast Doubt on Guidelines, USA TODAY,
Jul. 12, 2004, at A3; Bob Egelko, Supreme Court Creates Seismic Shift in Legal System;
Justices Upend Rules on Sentencing, Hearsay Testimony, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 18, 2004,
available at http://sfgate.comcgi-bin/article. cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/07/18/
MNGAU7NGO11.DTL (last visited Apr. 2, 2005); Anne Gearan, Supreme Court Decision
Throws States' Guidelines into Question, PENN. L. WEEKLY, July 5, 2004, at 17; Adam Lip-
tak, Sentencing Decision's Reach is Far and Wide: Scholars Predict the Ruling Will Invali-
date Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A16; David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein,
Ruling Could Change Sentencing Nationwide, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A24; Kate
Smith & William Stuntz, Sense and Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A27; Henry
Weinstein, Ruling Causes Uncertainty in Sentencing, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at A14.
But cf. Memorandum from James Comey, Deputy Attorney General, to All Federal Prose-
cutors, Department of Justice Legal Positions and Policies in Light of Blakely v. Washing-
ton, reprinted in 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 357 (2004).
5. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). The Booker decision consolidated
United States v. Booker, No. 04-104 and United States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105.
This article was written prior to the Supreme Court's release of its ruling in Booker and
Fanfan. The Court held in Booker that the mandatory system of Guidelines is unconstitu-
tional, and that the Guidelines should instead be applied on an "advisory" basis, with ap-
pellate review of district court sentencing decision making for "reasonableness." See id. at
756. Although the Supreme Court's rulings have significantly altered the constitutional
landscape of federal sentencing, they do not change any significant part of the doctrinal or
theoretical analysis in this Article.
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greater punishment at sentencing than the jury's guilty verdict
authorized at trial. In my view, a guilty verdict by definition au-
thorizes the court to impose any sentence up to the maximum
prescribed by the crime of conviction. Because federal crimes and
their maximum sentences are defined by statute, this Article con-
cludes the Constitution cannot be violated by nonstatutory Guide-
lines that require the imposition of sentences that are less than
the crime of conviction's statutory maximum.
A. Background
The landmark in modern sentencing law is Apprendi v. New
Jersey,6 which forbids judges from imposing any sentence above
the statutory maximum for a defendant's crime of conviction.7
Apprendi invalidated a New Jersey law that allowed sentencing
judges to assign an enhanced sentence, greater than the other-
wise applicable statutory maximum, based on a postconviction
judicial finding that the defendant's offense was a hate crime.'
The Court held that where a defendant is convicted of unlawful
firearm possession, which has a statutory maximum of ten years
imprisonment, the Constitution bars the judge from assigning
any prison term longer than that.9 To impose a sentence greater
than the statutory maximum, in effect, would be to convict a de-
fendant of a lesser crime, yet sentence her for a greater one.
Thus, before a judge may use contested facts to sentence a defen-
dant above her crime of conviction's statutory maximum, Ap-
prendi requires that those facts be charged in the indictment and
proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt-just like any element
of a conventional, aggravated offense.1" The question Apprendi
left open was whether other facts might require similar treat-
ment.
6. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
7. Id. at 490.
8. Id. at 468-69, 490-497; see also id. at 468 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(c)
(West Supp. 2000)) (authorizing an "extended term" of imprisonment where "[t]he defen-
dant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or
group... because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnic-
ity").
9. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
10. Id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring); cf. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243
n.6 (1999) (announcing the rule in a case of statutory interpretation concerning "constitu-
tional doubt").
2005] 1157
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From the start, four dissenting Justices feared that Apprendi's
scope would exceed its terms." The dissenters viewed Apprendi
as a radical decision that, unless strictly limited to statutory
maxima, might unseat three principles of modern sentencing.
First, the dissenters worried over the Apprendi Court's reference
to facts that alter a defendant's range of possible sentences.2 To
focus constitutional analysis upon the range of sentences left to a
judge's discretion would imply that facts altering a mandatory
minimum need indictment and jury trial because minima (like
maxima) impose legally binding limits on the range of sentences
that a judge has discretion to impose. The dissenters thus feared
that an expanded, range-based view of Apprendi might prevent
judges from applying any mandatory minimum sentence unless
its factual basis was alleged in the indictment and proved to a
jury.13 That risk seemed important because in McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania 4 the Court upheld judicially applied mandatory minima
as constitutional, 5 and lower courts imposed many sentences un-
der statutes that followed McMillan's rule. 6
11. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 543-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 555-66 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). The other two dissenting votes were Justice Anthony Kennedy and Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist.
12. Compare id. at 481, 490, with id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring), and id. at 520,
522 (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 563 (Breyer, J., dissenting); accord
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 572 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring); id at 577-80
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
14. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
15. Id. at 91-92.
16. E.g., Harris, 536 U.S. at 567; see, e.g., Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009-
29 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A); Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 708(a), 110 Stat. 1296
(1996) (adding mandatory minimum penalties to 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) and (i)); Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 6371, 102 Stat. 4370 (1988) (including mandatory minima under 21 U.S.C. §
844a for serious crack possession); Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207-2 to 3207-4
(1986) (including mandatory minimum terms under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)); ALA. CODE § 13A-
5-6(a)(4), (5) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(b) (Michie 2004) (including mandatory min-
ima when proved that defendant has a close relationship to the child murder victim); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-604.02(B) (2001) (including minimum sentences before a prisoner receives
release status); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(c)(8)(a) (2003) (requiring "extraordinary ag-
gravating circumstances" before deviating from the minimum); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
775.082(9)(a)(1) (West 2000) (defining "prison release reoffender"); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/5-5-3.2 (West 1997) (including factors in aggravation that allow more severe sen-
tencing); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4635 (1995) (requiring judges to determine if the defendant
is required to serve a "hard 40" for first degree murder); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4618 (1994)
(adding mandatory jail time for crimes with firearms); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 5-
627(c) (including minima for crimes relating to controlled dangerous substance near
school), 5-905 (including higher minima for repeat offenders); 14-101 (2002) (including
mandatory sentences for crimes of violence); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.11 (West 2003); MO.
1158 [Vol. 39:1155
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The dissenters' second concern was that Apprendi might bar
judicial sentence enhancements above any legal baseline, regard-
less of the statutory maximum. That issue seemed overwhelm-
ingly important because, as the dissenters well knew, the Guide-
lines depend on nonstatutory, judicially imposed sentence
enhancements. 7 The Sentencing Reform Act of 19848 created an
"independent commission in the judicial branch" called the Fed-
eral Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing Commission"), 19 which
in turn promulgates guidelines that district judges are bound
(with narrow exceptions) to follow in determining a defendant's
sentence.2" Although the Guidelines dictate that no sentence may
ANN. STAT. § 558.018.5(7) (West 1999) (including minima for predatory sexual offender);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(c), (d) (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6314(a) (West
1998) (including minima for the delivery of controlled substance to a minor); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6314(b) (West 1998) (including four specified circumstances during delivery
of a controlled substance that increase the minima); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6317(a)
(West 1998) (including minima for delivery of controlled substance within specified dis-
tance of school property, playground, or on a school bus); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7508(a)(4) (West 1998) (including minima dependent upon the nature and quality of con-
trolled substance delivered or intended to be delivered); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
9712(a), (b) (West 2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9713(a) (West 1998) (including minima
for specified offense committed in or near public transportation); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9717(a) (West 2004) (including minima when victim is over sixty years of age and not a
police officer); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9718(a) (West 2004) (including mandatory terms
when victim is either under sixteen years of age or thirteen years of age); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9719(a) (West 2004) (including mandatory minima for offenses committed by
person impersonating a law enforcement officer); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3742(b) (West
1996) (including minima for defendants who leave the scene of a car accident involving
serious bodily injury or death); Virgin Islands Gun Control Act of 2001, 2001 V.I. Sess.
Laws 6493.
17. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544, 550-51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 561
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stephen Breyer was an original member of the Sentencing
Commission, see United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 445-47 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.).
For his important explanation of the guideline system, see Stephen Breyer, The Guidelines
and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1988) [here-
inafter Key Compromises]. Justice Breyer has been critical but cautiously optimistic about
the Guidelines' present form and future prospects. Justice Stephen Breyer, Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines Revisited, Remarks at the University of Nebraska College of Law
(Nov. 18, 1998), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/read
ings/breyer.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
18. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994 ("Duties of the Commission"); 28
U.S.C. § 995 ("Powers of the Commission").
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) ("The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, referred to in [the Guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consid-
eration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in
a sentence different from that described.").
There are limited circumstances where a sentencing court need not follow the Guide-
lines' prescriptions. The two most important are where the prosecution requests a reduced
2005] 1159
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be imposed above the crime of conviction's statutory maximum,21
many instances require judges to increase a defendant's base of-
fense level using factual findings that do not derive from the in-
dictment or the crime of conviction.22 The Guidelines combine the
resultant offense level and the defendant's criminal history on a
two-dimensional Sentencing Table to prescribe the applicable
sentencing range.2
To understand how the Guidelines work, imagine a defendant
convicted of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).24 Section
2113(a) provides a twenty-year statutory maximum sentence
where the jury convicts one of forcibly' taking something of value
from a banking institution.25 Under the Guidelines, however, a
district judge cannot choose just any sentence between zero and
twenty years. Guideline section 2B3.1 provides that robbery-
based crimes have a base offense level of twenty;26 that level is
enhanced by two if the robbery involves a financial institution's
property 27 and by three more if the loss exceeds $250,000.28 Thus,
for a first-offense bank robber, the Guidelines could provide a
sentence of forty-one to fifty-one months (offense level twenty-
two) if the judge finds no evidence of the amount stolen, but of
fifty-seven to eighty-one months (level twenty-five) if the sentenc-
ing judge finds that the robbery involved $250,001.29 The Guide-
sentence based on the defendant's substantial assistance, id. § 3553(e); and where the
judge finds and explains circumstances that the Guidelines system has not adequately
taken into consideration. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter GUIDELINES]; GUIDELINES § 5K2.0; see also KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 72-77 (1998); GUIDELINES §§ 5K2.1 to
5K2.21 (discussing other grounds for departure).
21. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 5G1.1(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2000) (requir-
ing all guidelines to be consistent with statutory provisions of the United States Criminal
Code).
22. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, §§ 1B1.1, 1B1.3, 3A1.1 to 3C1.2, 3E1.1.
23. Id. ch. 5, pt. A (setting forth the Federal Sentencing Table, with offense levels of
one to forty-three along the y-axis and criminal history scores of one to six along the x-
axis).
24. For a general discussion of the Guidelines that predates the Apprendi Revolution,
see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 20. Another insightful pre-Apprendi discussion, which
proposes an interesting assessment of and solution to the Guidelines' procedural chal-
lenges, is Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Consti-
tutional Significance of the "Elements of the Sentence," 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147 (1993).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2000).
26. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 2B3.1(a).
27. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(1).
28. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(D).
29. See id. ch. 5, pt. A.
1160 [Vol. 39:1155
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lines require such enhancements even though their supporting
facts do not appear in the indictment, and their findings are made
by sentencing judges, not juries.
Apprendi's dissenters realized that the Guidelines could sur-
vive only if the majority's logic were limited to statutory maxima.
The Guidelines always prescribe a sentence lower than the statu-
tory maximum for the crime of conviction (e.g., twenty years for
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)); they thus satisfy the terms of Apprendi's
statutory maximum rule.30 But if future cases were expanded to
require jury factfinding for sentences imposed above any non-
statutory maximum, then almost every upward adjustment to a
defendant's base offense level might be unconstitutional, thereby
upsetting numerous sentences under the Guidelines.31 To such
concerns, the Apprendi majority replied only that "[tihe Guide-
lines are, of course, not before the Court. We therefore express no
view on the subject beyond what this Court has already held."32
The dissenters' third concern (of less importance here) involved
Arizona's capital punishment system, which the Court had previ-
ously upheld. 33 Although the Apprendi majority claimed that its
30. Id. § 5G1.1(a).
31. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544, 551 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 565 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). Some academic commentators agreed with the dissenters that Apprendi
was inconsistent with the Guidelines. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding
and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1148, 1171-72
(2001); Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-land": Statutory
Minimums and the Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 390 (2002); Freya Russell,
Casenote, Limiting the Use of Acquitted and Uncharged Conduct at Sentencing: Apprendi
v. New Jersey and Its Effect on the Relevant Conduct Provision of the United States Guide-
lines, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (2001); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Determinate Sen-
tencing in Light of the Supreme Court's "Elements" Jurisprudence, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1236,
1251-54 (2004). Other scholars thought Apprendi's impact would be more limited. See,
e.g., Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolu-
tion?, 87 IOwA L. REV. 615, 621-24 (2002); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential
Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1478-79 (2001); Alan C. Michaels, Truth in Convicting:
Understanding and Evaluating Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 320 (2000); Jeffrey
Standen, The End of the Era of Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOwA L. REV. 775,
796-801 (2002); Andrew J. Fuchs, Note, The Effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey on the
Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and Elements of a Crime,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1426 (2001); Ethan Glass, Comment, Whatever Happened to the
Trial By Jury? The Unconstitutionality of Upward Departures Under the United States
Guidelines, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 343, 358-62 (2002).
32. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n.21 (citing Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511,
515 (1998)).
33. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). Arizona's capital sentencing system
shared characteristics with those of several other states. See Stephanos Bibas, Back from
the Brink: The Supreme Court Balks at Extending Apprendi to Upset Most Sentencing, 15
2005] 1161
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decision did not affect the Arizona death penalty,34 the same Jus-
tices reversed course two years later in Ring v. Arizona3' and held
that Arizona's capital system improperly relied on judicial "ag-
gravating factors" to kill defendants for whom the statutory
maximum sentence was life imprisonment.36
In the years immediately following Apprendi, the dissenters'
fears about mandatory minima failed to materialize. On the con-
trary, in Harris v. United States37  a plurality found that
McMillan remained good law, 38 that statutory minima were dif-
ferent from statutory maxima,39 and that judicially imposed man-
datory minima were permissible based on facts not found by the
jury or charged in the indictment.4' The Guidelines seemed simi-
larly secure. After Apprendi, every court of appeals held that
nonstatutory Guideline enhancements satisfy the Constitution
because Guideline sentences are always less than the crime of
conviction's statutory maximum." Although numerous defen-
FED. SENTENCING REP. 79, 80 (2002).
34. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.
35. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
36. Id. at 597 ("Based solely on the jury's verdict finding Ring guilty of first-degree
felony murder, the maximum punishment he could have received was life imprison-
ment .... This was so because, in Arizona, a death sentence may not legally be im-
posed ... unless at least one aggravating factor is found to exist . . . ." (citations and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); cf Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003)
(describing Ring as holding that, "for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guar-
antee, the underlying offense of 'murder' is a distinct, lesser included offense of 'murder
plus one or more aggravating circumstances': Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a
maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the latter increases the maximum permissible
sentence to death").
37. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
38. Id. at 556-57 (plurality opinion).
39. Id. at 557 (plurality opinion).
40. Id.; Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004).
41. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 335 F.3d 589, 591-92 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1011 (2003); United States v. Piggie, 316 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. de-
nied, 540 U.S. 857 (2003); United States v. Toliver, 351 F.3d 423, 434 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 2429 (2004); United States v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d 1013, 1020
(10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1063 (2002); United States v. Bartholomew, 310
F.3d 912, 925-26 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1177 (2003); United States v. Mar-
ino, 277 F.3d 11, 38 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 948 (2002); United States v.
Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 961 (2003); United
States v. Rivera, 282 F.3d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 931 (2002);
United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 818
(2001); United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
937 (2001); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1177 (2001); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. de-
nied, 534 U.S. 1023 (2001).
1162 [Vol. 39:1155
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dants sought review of those decisions, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, suggesting that the dissenters might have overstated
Apprendi's disruptive potential."
Then came Blakely v. Washington.43 In Blakely, the Court ap-
plied Apprendi to invalidate a sentence imposed under Washing-
ton state law." The relevant provisions warrant close attention,
but for now it is enough to note that Washington's statutory sys-
tem and the Guidelines were remarkably similar in content.45 In-
deed, the United States filed an amicus brief admitting that any
differences between the Washington and federal systems might
not "be sufficient [to save the Guidelines] if this Court applied
Apprendi" to Washington's statutory system. 6 Regardless of its
accuracy, that concession advised the Court that Blakely at least
abutted the question that has loomed large since Apprendi:
After the Supreme Court's decision in Harris, academic commentators also seemed
largely unconcerned that the Guidelines might be held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Bibas,
supra note 33, at 80 ("The upshot is that Apprendi, which once threatened the Guidelines
and the national trend toward determinate sentencing, is now a caged tiger."); Julie L.
Hendrix, Harris v. United States: The Supreme Court's Latest Avoidance of Providing
Constitutional Protection to Sentencing Factors, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 947, 968-
71 (2003); Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, The Offense of Convic-
tion, and the Limited Role of Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 885-91 (2004); Char-
lotte LeClercq, Comment, The 2002 Supreme Court Decisions: Did They Leave Enough of
Apprendi to Effectively Protect Criminal Defendants?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 117, 140-44
(2003). For an exception to that trend, see Note, supra note 31, at 1251-54.
42. See cases cited supra note 41. Two other factors mitigated Apprendi's practical
effect. First is the Court's refusal to overrule Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224 (1998), which permitted judges to enhance sentences above the statutory maximum
based on a defendant's criminal history. But cf Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (indicating that his necessary fifth vote in the Almendarez-Torres majority
was "an error"); Shepard v. United States, 348 F.3d 308 (1st Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 2871 (2004) (raising constitutional questions regarding the treatment of criminal
history). Second, in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), the Court held that Ap-
prendi errors not raised at the time of trial-i.e., almost all of them before 1999-are re-
viewed under stringent standards of "plain-error." Id. at 631-33. Cotton thus allowed the
government to adapt to Apprendi's rule prospectively without disrupting large numbers of
past sentences.
43. 124 S. Ct. 2531.
44. Id. at 2536, 2538.
45. See infra notes 80-97 and accompanying text. The dissenting Justices in Blakely
repeatedly referred to Washington's system as a "sentencing guideline scheme[ I," Blakely,
124 S. Ct. at 2543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), thereby stressing its substantive similarity to
the Guidelines. The Court's opinion did not refer to Washington's system as a set of guide-
lines. This Article, however, follows the latter convention.
46. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Blakely
v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632); see also id. at 29-30 ("It is... not
certain that this Court would ultimately conclude that the differences between the Wash-
ington system and the Guidelines are of constitutional magnitude.").
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whether enhanced sentences under the Guidelines are constitu-
tional. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Blakely-like that in
Apprendi-expressly disavowed any view as to the Guidelines'
constitutionality. 7
Despite the Blakely Court's reticence concerning the Guide-
lines, the reaction to that decision was overwhelming. Apprendi's
dissenters dissented again, but their rhetoric describing Blakely's
effect on the Guidelines was unnerving. 4 Without mentioning
prior, false prophecies concerning the death of mandatory min-
ima, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in Blakely proclaimed that
"[w]hat I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of
sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of crimi-
nal judgments are in jeopardy."49 In a later statement to the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, Justice O'Connor character-
ized the Court's decision making in Blakely as "disgust[ing]" and
its result as a "No. 10 earthquake.""
As though to fulfill such forecasts, the federal appellate courts
responded to Blakely by producing one of the quickest, most ro-
bust circuit conflicts on record. Discarding earlier circuit law as
47. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9. The Court's language in Apprendi and Blakely is
markedly similar. Compare id. ("The United States, as amicus curiae, urges us to affirm.
It notes differences between Washington's sentencing regime and the Guidelines but ques-
tions whether those differences are constitutionally significant. The Federal Guidelines
are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.") (citation omitted), with Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 497 n.21 ("The Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court. We therefore
express no view on the subject beyond what this Court has already held.") (citing Edwards
v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998) (holding that a sentencing judge may determine
drug type and quantity for guidelines purposes, regardless of the jury's verdict, so long as
the ultimate sentence lies "within the statutory limits" relevant to the crime of convic-
tion)).
48. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is no answer to
say that today's opinion impacts only Washington's scheme and not others, such as, for
example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.... Indeed, [Washington's] provision struck
down today is as inoffensive to the holding of Apprendi as a regime of guided discretion
could possibly be .... If the Washington scheme does not comport with the Constitution, it
is hard to imagine a guidelines scheme that would."); id. at 2561 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("Until now, I would have thought the Court might have limited Apprendi so that its un-
derlying principle would not undo sentencing reform efforts. Today's case dispels that illu-
sion.... Perhaps the Court will distinguish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but I am
uncertain how.").
49. Id. at 2550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50. Associated Press, O'Connor Disgusted by Federal Sentencing Case, available at
http://www.donnunn.com/spiel/2004/07/cnncom-a_hrefht-l.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005)
[hereinafter O'Connor Disgusted].
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"of course no longer authoritative," 1 Judge Richard A. Posner
wrote for a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit that Guideline
enhancements are invalid under Blakely.12 A divided Ninth Cir-
cuit panel agreed.53 In contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits held that Blakely does not alter prior prece-
dents upholding the Guidelines.54 The Second Circuit took the
unusual step of certifying a request for a Supreme Court decision
on whether guideline enhancements survive Blakely and request-
ing expedited briefing and argument during the Supreme Court's
summer recess.
55
Commentators did not calm the waters either. Academics im-
mediately described Blakely as having blockbuster status, and
many commentators have since characterized the Guidelines' un-
constitutionality as a foregone conclusion.56 Congress also re-
sponded to the Blakely decision with vigor. After conducting a
Committee Hearing, the Senate unanimously resolved that the
Supreme Court should act quickly to resolve Blakely's after-
math.57 Twelve days later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in two Guideline cases, United States v. Booker" and United
States v. Fanfan.59
51. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 11 (2004).
52. Id.
53. United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004).
54. United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States
v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436, 438 (6th
Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004).
55. United States v. Peneranda, 375 F.3d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit
later sided with the majority of circuits and upheld the Guidelines. United States v. Min-
cey, 106 Fed. Appx. 750, 751 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
56. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
57. S. Con. Res. 130 at 4, 150 Cong. Rec. S8572-74 (July 21, 2004) ("Now, therefore,
be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense
of Congress that the Supreme Court of the United States should act expeditiously to re-
solve the current confusion and inconsistency in the Federal criminal justice system by
promptly considering and ruling on the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines.").
58. 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 11 (2004).
59. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593 (D. Me. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 12 (2004).
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B. A New Approach
This Article views Blakely and its succeeding events as an im-
portant opportunity to investigate principles that undergird the
Supreme Court's sentencing revolution, and to analyze whether
those principles require the Guidelines' invalidation. Part II chal-
lenges the popular premise that such theoretical analysis is un-
necessary because Blakely already held the Guidelines unconsti-
tutional. After examining Blakely's language and context, I argue
that the decision did not resolve any issue essential to the Guide-
lines' status. As the Court explained, Washington's statutory sys-
tem in Blakely was nearly identical to the New Jersey statutes
that were struck down in Apprendi.6" Thus, Blakely itself broke
little ground, and the key question about the Guidelines remains
unanswered because neither Blakely nor Apprendi considered the
status of nonstatutory maximum sentences. Although certain
ambiguous language in Blakely might be read to address the
Guidelines, the Court's opinion does not require that interpreta-
tion, which in any event would contradict the Court's clear state-
ment that (as in Apprendi) it "express[ed] no opinion" about the
Guidelines' status.6'
Insofar as Blakely did not consider the Guidelines' constitu-
tionality, the case is important mainly as a predictive signal of
what the Court might hold in Booker. Even to careful
court-watchers, however, Blakely's clearest message may be that
the odd combination of justices composing the Apprendi/Blakely
majority-John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, David Souter, Cla-
rence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg-has at least one mem-
ber with uncertain or divergent views about the Guidelines'
status. The "swing vote" in other Apprendi cases is Justice Scalia,
Blakely's author, which may confirm that Blakely left the Guide-
lines' constitutionality open. My point is not to predict the Court's
result in Booker, but rather to identify the open question that I
think the Court confronts, so that the relevant issues may be ana-
lyzed with a warranted level of care both before and after that de-
cision issues.
60. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
61. Id. at 2538 n.9; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n.21.
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Part III pursues theoretical issues that have been lost in
Blakely's shadow.62 In my view, controversies over the Guidelines'
status embody fundamental disputes about the constitutional
right at stake. This Article discusses three models of Apprendi
and defends a theory under which a jury verdict's constitutional
meaning connects with separation of powers principles. The
Guidelines are distinct from Washington's system in Blakely be-
cause the former are nonstatutory rules of an agency within the
judicial branch, while the latter are statutes enacted by a state
legislature. I view that difference as significant not only because
the Court has repeatedly used the phrase "statutory maximum"
as the singular term that defines Apprendi rights." More impor-
tantly, Apprendi's procedural right depends on the maximum
sentence that is "authorized by the jury's guilty verdict."64
Not every increased sentence violates Apprendi. On the con-
trary, the Constitution protects only against sentence enhance-
ments above what the jury authorized by its conviction. So how
does one know what the jury authorized? This is the core question
that has escaped academic and judicial attention as to Apprendi
cases. Although the terms of a jury's verdict establish guilt, they
do not explicitly specify the maximum punishment that may be
imposed. Instead, the verdict's role in authorizing punishment
must be deduced by reference to the definition of the crime of con-
viction. Convictions for shoplifting and murder carry different
maximum sentences only because the statutes defining such
crimes say so. For similar reasons, a guilty verdict authorizes
62. Most scholars after Blakely have turned their attention to what would happen if
the Court does find the Guidelines to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 4,
at 312-15; Douglas A. Berman, Examining the Blakely Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16
FED. SENTENCING REP. 307 (2004); Bibas, supra note 4, at 335-40; Bowman, supra note 4,
at 364-68; King & Klein, supra note 4, at 317-332; Osler, supra note 4, at 344-47; cf. J.
Bradley O'Connell, Amazing Stories: Blakely v. Washington and California Determinate
Sentences, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 348 (discussing Blakely's potential application to
California sentencing). Such important issues concerning the property "remedy" will not
be considered here.
63. Booker, 375 F.3d at 518 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("Attributing to Blakely the
view that it does not matter whether a given rule appears in a statute makes hash of
'statutory maximum.' Why did the Justices deploy that phrase in Apprendi and repeat it
in Blakely (and quite a few other decisions)? Just to get a chuckle at the expense of other
judges who took them seriously and thought that 'statutory maximum' might have some-
thing to do with statutes? Why write 'statutory maximum' if you mean 'all circumstances
that go into ascertaining the proper sentence'?").
64. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494; accord Harris, 536 U.S. at 557, 565; see also Blakely,
124 S. Ct. at 2538.
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punishment only to the extent provided by the crime of convic-
tion. 5
Under federal law, crimes may be defined only by congressional
statutes, not guidelines from the Sentencing Commission. Accord-
ingly, I suggest that, no matter what substatutory sentencing
rules may provide, a jury's conviction for a particular statutory
crime authorizes the defendant to receive any sentence up to the
maximum set forth in the statute defining the crime of conviction.
Apprendi should not apply to the Guidelines because they are not
statutes,66 they do not define crimes, and they do not subject any
defendant to a sentence greater than what the jury authorized by
its verdict.
In my view, Apprendi rights establish a constitutional link be-
tween the statutory definition of a crime, the maximum sentence
imposed by that definition, and the jury's decision to convict of
the crime so defined. The connection between those three con-
cepts is important, but limited. Congress's role in defining crimes
and their punishments suggests to me that Apprendi should ap-
ply only to sentences above the statutory maximum, and not to
submaximal sentences under nonstatutory guidelines.
There is an undeniable formalism here. The Guidelines signifi-
cantly affect a defendant's actual term of imprisonment within
the statutory range, they restrict the sentencing judge's discre-
tion to impose certain sentences beneath the statutory maximum,
and they do so based on judicial fact-finding that requires only a
preponderance of evidence. The deepest challenge faced in Part
III is to explain why some degree of formalism is inherent in Ap-
prendi jurisprudence, and why the proposed distinction between
statutory and nonstatutory sentencing rules presents the best
available solution to the difficult problems that continue to trou-
ble the Court.
65. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490-91 n.16 ("If facts found by a jury support a guilty
verdict of murder, the judge is authorized by that jury verdict to sentence the defendant to
the maximum sentence provided by the murder statute.").
66. Although this may seem evident to some readers, I note that the Guidelines do not
qualify as statutes because (with one recent exception discussed infra note 117) they do
not pass the requirements of bicameral enactment and presentment for presidential veto.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Instead, the Guidelines are promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission and submitted to Congress, and they take effect automatically unless "disap-
proved by Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2000).
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As a postscript of sorts, Part IV analyzes the flurried events
that set the stage for the Booker decision, in which the Court will
decide the Guidelines' constitutional status. It is often true that
the events giving rise to a case illuminate its significance, and
Booker is no exception. Analysis of how the post-Blakely "crisis"
emerged suggests that the Court must now confront the Guide-
lines cases at an institutional disadvantage, and the unusual in-
cidents that followed Blakely provide a case study in how signifi-
cant certain repeat players can be in constitutional rule making.
This Article not only suggests that the compressed circum-
stances surrounding Booker could be avoided in other cases, but
also furnishes an illustrative step toward understanding the in-
terrelationship among, and proper roles of, Supreme Court dis-
sents, appellate courts' practice, governmental litigation, and the
Supreme Court's certiorari practice. Insofar as the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions remain incomparably dominant
in our legal system, the path from Blakely to Booker highlights
certain safeguards that aid the Court's decision making process,
and how such underappreciated safeguards can be tested.
II. BLAKELY AND THE POWER OF DISSENTS
A. Blakely and Apprendi
A detail overlooked in current sentencing discussions is that,
after Apprendi, Blakely's result was simple and required little
new analysis.67 In contrast to its splash in the public arena, the
Blakely opinion begins with a modest self-image: "This case re-
quires us to apply the rule we expressed in Apprendi v. New Jer-
sey: . . . '[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'68 The opinion is short
67. This does not dispute that, as a historical matter, many were surprised by
Blakely's result. See, e.g., King & Klein, supra note 4, at 323-24 (explaining the authors'
anecdotal impression "that judges and lawyers around the nation were stunned by the
Blakely decision"). That surprise reflected the near-consensus view among courts and
commentators that the Guidelines were constitutionally valid, see supra note 41 and ac-
companying text, and the popular assumption that the Washington statutory system can-
not be distinguished from the federal nonstatutory system, see supra note 4.
68. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (citation omitted).
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and straightforward, with over half devoted to refuting dissenting
arguments that had previously been rejected in Apprendi.69 None-
theless, because numerous commentators have claimed that the
Blakely decision spelled the Guidelines' doom,7 ° our first step is to
demonstrate that the Guidelines' constitutionality is as uncertain
after Blakely as it was after Apprendi itself.
1. Apprendi v. New Jersey
Apprendi concerned a pair of New Jersey statutes. One set the
maximum sentence for unlawful firearm possession at ten
years.7' The other created a hate-crime enhancement that allowed
judges to impose a twenty-year maximum sentence based on a
preponderance of the evidence." Through those provisions, New
Jersey's legislature could be seen as providing a "true" maximum
sentence of twenty years for unlawful firearm possession. That is,
the legislature authorized a twenty-year sentence for some con-
victed firearm defendants, but only allowed judges to apply the
top half of that range to criminals who were motivated by dis-
criminatory animus.
Apprendi held the New Jersey scheme unconstitutional, but
what the Court did not hold also is important. The Court found
nothing inherently unsound about New Jersey's twenty-year
maximum sentence for unlawful firearm possession. Indeed, if
New Jersey had passed a twenty-year maximum for all unlawful
firearm possession, state judges presumably could have decided
on their own to apply sentences greater than ten years exclu-
sively to hate-criminals.
New Jersey's problem lay in its method of pursuing such goals.
The Apprendi Court held that New Jersey could not define a
crime with one maximum sentence, but authorize judges to im-
pose a sentence greater than that.73 The Court found that-in
taking that second statutory step-New Jersey created a special
69. Id. at 2538-43; see also id. at 2536-37 nn.5-6.
70. See supra notes 3-4, 41 and accompanying text.
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995) (classifying unlawful possession of a
firearm as a "crime of the second degree"); id. § 2C:43-b(a)(2) (setting the prison term for a
"crime of the second degree" at "between five years and 10 years").
72. Id. §§ 2C:44-3(e), 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West 1995).
73. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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crime of hateful firearm possession, but impermissibly allowed
the elemental finding of group-based animus to be made without
the safeguard of jury trial beyond reasonable doubt."4 In essence,
the Apprendi Court found that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
bar a state from convicting defendants of one crime and sentenc-
ing them for another.
As should be clear, Apprendi's key move was to interpret New
Jersey's scheme as two formal steps, not as a functional whole au-
thorizing twenty-year sentences for some, but not all, firearm vio-
lators. In Apprendi's case, the judge found that the defendant
fired bullets into an African-American family's home because he
disliked having neighbors who were "black in color."75 New Jer-
sey's legislature had explicitly provided that such defendants,
when convicted of unlawful firearm possession, should be eligible
for a sentence higher than ten years.76 The Constitution, however,
prohibited the State from fulfilling its intent by exceeding the
crime of conviction's statutory maximum.
2. Blakely v. Washington
In Blakely, Washington's statutory scheme was phrased differ-
ently from Apprendi's hate-crime enhancement, but its constitu-
tional dimensions were the same. Washington provided a statu-
tory maximum for the defendant's crime of conviction, yet
authorized a judicially determined sentence greater than that.77
The Washington statutes' history is illustrative. Before 1981,
Washington felonies were statutorily categorized as "Class A,"
"Class B," or "Class C," and the same maximum sentence applied
to felonies in a class.78 For example, all Class B felonies had a
statutory maximum sentence of ten years,79 and sentencing
74. Id. Similarly, in Apprendi's precursor Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999),
the Court construed the federal carjacking statute, contrary to its terms, as creating three
different crimes, such that the elements of each must be presented in the indictment and
to the petit jury. Id. at 229. The constitutional doubt that was avoided in Jones has now
become the constitutional rule after Apprendi.
75. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
76. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West 1995).
77. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534.
78. Id. at 2544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.020(1)(b) (West 2000); cf. State v. Walker, 619
P.2d 699, 700 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
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judges had broad discretion to impose any punishment below that
maximum.
Over time, the state legislature was dissatisfied that different
judges could use their individual discretion to assign similar sen-
tences to defendants who engaged in different criminal conduct
and different sentences to defendants whose criminal conduct
was identical."0 Washington thus enacted a Sentencing Reform
Act."' Under that statute, different felonies were assigned differ-
ent offense seriousness levels that the sentencing judge combined
on a two-dimensional grid with a defendant's offender score to
produce a statutory "standard sentenc[ing] range." 2 Also by stat-
ute, Washington provided an "exceptional sentence" greater than
the standard sentencing range, if the judge found "substantial
and compelling reasons justifying" such actions.8 3 Even for excep-
tional sentences however, Washington's preexisting limits for
particular classes of felony (e.g., ten years for Class B) remained
in effect.8 4
The facts of Blakely exemplify how the Washington statutes
worked. The defendant was indicted for second-degree kidnaping;
he pleaded guilty and acknowledged the use of a firearm." By
80. See David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington,
28 CRIME AND JUSTICE 71, 126-28 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001). Similar problems arose in
other jurisdictions with respect to "discretionary sentencing" schemes. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 98-225, at 38 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.S.C.A.N. 3182, 3221 (Senate Report on the
Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984's precursor); Federal Criminal Law Revision:
Hearing on H.R. 1647, H.R. 4492, H.R. 4711, H.R. 5679, and H.R. 5703 Before the House
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1179
(1984) (statement of Henry Schwarzschild, Director, Capital Punishment Project, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union) (providing statistics on the racial disparities in death penalty
sentencing); H.R. REP. NO. 85-1946, at 6 (1958) (noting the "existence of widespread dis-
parities in the sentences imposed by Federal courts"); 1938 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 6, 7
(criticizing "wide disparities and great inequalities in sentences imposed... for identical
offenses involving similar states of facts"); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING §
1:3, at 9-10 & nn.45-46 (2d ed. 1991) (collecting evidence of race- and gender-based dis-
parities); MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5, 66 (1972) (de-
crying such disparities as "terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion
to the rule of law"); Key Compromises, supra note 17, at 5.
81. 1981 Wash. Laws, ch. 137 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A).
82. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.120 (recodified at § 9.94A.505), 9.94A.310 (recodi-
fled at § 9.94A.5 10). For similarities in the content of the Washington and the federal sen-
tencing regimes, see supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
83. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (providing an illustrative list of factors that
may be considered in imposing an exceptional sentence).
84. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.420 (recodified at § 9.94A.599).
85. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.40.030(1)
(West 2000), 10.99.020(3)(p) (West 2002), 9.94A.125 (recodified at § 9.94A.602) (West
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statute, conviction of second-degree kidnaping carried an offense
seriousness level of V and an offender score of two. 6 Under Wash-
ington's grid, a conviction of second-degree kidnaping thus had a
standard sentencing range of thirteen to seventeen months,87 and
firearm use increased that range by thirty-six months.88 Because
Blakely's plea agreement acknowledged that he used a firearm,
his statutory sentencing range was forty-nine to fifty-three
months.8 9
Washington also provided by statute that, if the sentencing
judge found that a second-degree kidnaper acted with deliberate
cruelty, the judge could find a "substantial and compelling rea-
son[ ]" for imposing an exceptional sentence of up to ten years.90
In Blakely's case, the sentencing court made a sua sponte finding
of deliberate cruelty and imposed an exceptional sentence of
ninety months.91 Because ninety months was greater than sec-
ond-degree kidnaping's fifty-three-month statutory maximum,
Blakely claimed that his sentence violated Apprendi.92 The sen-
tencing judge disagreed, and held that the only relevant statutory
maximum was the ten years applicable to all Class B felonies.93
3. Peas in a Pod
In both Apprendi and Blakely, the state sought to authorize dif-
ferent statutory maxima for defendants who, in the state's view,
were convicted of the same crime. Both New Jersey and Washing-
ton claimed that, despite the maximum in the statute defining
the crime of conviction, the true maximum sentence was what the
judge could impose postenhancement.94 The Supreme Court re-
2003).
86. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.320 (recodified at § 9.94A.515) (West 2003).
87. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.510 (West 2003).
88. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.310(3)(b) (recodified at § 9.94A.5 10) (West 2003).
89. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
90. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (recodified at § 9.94A.535) (West
2003).
91. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
92. See id. at 2536-37.
93. See id. at 2537.
94. Some have characterized Blakely as presenting for the first time the problem of
dueling maximum sentence statutes. King & Klein, supra note 4, at 316. As discussed su-
pra, I believe that the same problem arose in Apprendi, and again in Ring. Cf King &
Klein, supra note 4, at 324 (observing that the Supreme Court in Ring rejected "the state's
argument that the statutory maximum sentence for first degree murder was death, in-
stead looking at the effect of the state law in limiting a convicted murderer's sentence to
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jected that argument and held that, whenever the legislature au-
thorizes an increased sentence above the statutory maximum, it
creates two crimes and must subject the aggravating element to
jury trial and proof beyond reasonable doubt.95
Washington, and the United States as amicus curiae, claimed
that Blakely differed from Apprendi, but those arguments mis-
construed Apprendi's rule. Washington argued that its statutory
scheme was valid because Washington judges retained discretion
both to determine whether a case evinced "substantial and com-
pelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence" and to decide
what counts as a "substantial and compelling reason."96 With full
respect to the litigants, one does not need hindsight to see why
such discretion is constitutionally irrelevant. If New Jersey's Ap-
prendi problem was authorizing sentences above the statutory
maximum, that flaw would certainly persist if enhancements
were imposed at the judge's option, or if they depended on find-
ings of "hate crime or other appropriately aggravating factor." As
the Blakely Court held: "Whether the judge's authority to impose
an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specified fact (as in
Apprendi), one of several specified facts (as in Ring), or any ag-
gravating fact (as here), it remains the case that the jury's verdict
alone does not authorize the sentence."97 As we shall see,98 Ap-
prendi rights are not about protecting judges' discretion to deter-
mine individual sentences, but about securing the criminal jury's
constitutional role in conviction.
life unless additional facts were found"). The litigants in Apprendi were less than direct in
articulating the dueling maximum issue because they sought to pretermit, rather than
satisfy, the application of any sort of statutory-maximum rule.
95. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 504.
96. Brief for the State of Washington at 15-16, 21-26, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.
Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632) [hereinafter Respondent's Briefl; see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14-15, 17-18, 20-22, Blakely
v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632) (arguing that Apprendi applies only
where the legislature specifies a factual finding that would authorize a sentence above the
statutory maximum); id. at 18-20 (claiming that Apprendi applies only to factual findings,
not matters of discretionary judgment).
97. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538. Even Blakely's dissenters made little effort to distin-
guish the Washington and New Jersey regimes as a matter of principle, relying instead
upon the damage and substantial costs that would arise, id. at 2544, 2546 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting), and the Court's disregard for valuable interbranch dialogue, id. at 2550-51
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). See id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Court makes clear
that it means what it said in Apprendi v. New Jersey.").
98. See infra Part III.C.1.
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Washington also asked the Supreme Court to defer to state
courts' holdings that its Sentencing Reform Act did not create
new statutory maxima, but merely structured judicial discre-
tion.9" The Court rejected that notion, repeating its earlier state-
ment that state-law labels do not limit Apprendi's constitutional
substance. 100 Just as statutory names like "element" or "sentenc-
ing factor" do not control whether a particular finding requires
indictment and trial by jury, the Blakely Court refused to credit
state court rulings that Washington's statutes should be called
something other than a statutory maximum sentence, thus escap-
ing Apprendi's rule. 10 1 If Blakely has any abiding legal signifi-
cance, it is for clarifying that the criteria for determining the
relevant statutory maximum are governed by federal constitu-
tional law, not state statutory law. 102 In other respects, Apprendi
and Blakely are nearly identical: each involved a defendant who
was convicted of one crime and sentenced for another.
B. Blakely's "Statutory Maximum"
The parts of Blakely that have received the most public atten-
tion are two paragraphs explaining why Blakely's statutory maxi-
mum was the fifty-three month maximum for second-degree kid-
naping, not the ten-year maximum for Class B felonies:
99. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 96, at 22-23, 26-27, 31-32. Washington also
claimed that Apprendi did not govern because the ten-year cap for Class B felonies re-
stricts any otherwise applicable standard sentencing range. Id. at 19. That ten-year limit
was irrelevant to Blakely's sentence, however, and did not change the Court's determina-
tion that Blakely's sentence was greater than the statutory maximum for second-degree
kidnaping. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 ("[P]etitioner was sentenced to more than three
years above the 53-month statutory maximum of the standard range because he had acted
with 'deliberate cruelty.'").
100. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2539 (noting that "[niot even Apprendi's critics would advo-
cate this absurd result"); see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I believe
that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that
all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives-
whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-
must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.").
101. Cf. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2547 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing state statutes and
a state court case as proof that "Washington's Sentencing Reform Act did not alter the
statutory maximum sentence to which [Blakely] was exposed").
102. Although the above text states the Court's dominant approach under Apprendi to
the relationship between state and federal law, a sufficiently broad disdain for state legal
characterizations might at some level conflict with Ring's statement that "the Arizona
court's construction of the State's own law is authoritative." Ring, 536 U.S. at 603 (citing
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)).
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Our precedents make clear ... that the "statutory maximum" for
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant. In other words, the relevant "statutory maximum"
is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding addi-
tional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional
findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict
alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts "which the
law makes essential to the punishment," and the judge exceeds his
proper authority.
The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-
month sentence solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty
plea.... Had the judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the
basis of the plea, he would have been reversed. The "maximum sen-
tence" is no more 10 years here than it was 20 years in Apprendi (be-
cause that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate
crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have
imposed upon finding an aggravator).103
Like similar passages in Apprendi, Ring, and Harris, the
above-quoted paragraphs do not consider nonstatutory sentencing
rules like the Guidelines. On the contrary, Blakely's terms merely
explain why the defendant's statutory maximum was fifty-three
months instead of ten years. By verdict and by statute, Blakely
was convicted of second-degree kidnaping, not "deliberately cruel
kidnaping" or "exceptional kidnaping." The legislature defined
the crime of conviction as "second-degree kidnaping," and the jury
applied that definition in its verdict. The Court simply and cor-
rectly held that a jury's conviction for second-degree kidnaping
(and "the facts reflected in [that] verdict") does not authorize the
State to impose a sentence greater than that crime's fifty-three-
month statutory maximum." 4 It is true that the Court offered a
somewhat broader conceptual description of the term "statutory
maximum." Such discussion, however, is best interpreted as fo-
cusing on the word "maximum," whose meaning was contested in
Blakely, rather than "statutory," which was not. From that per-
spective, the above paragraphs' reasoning seems solid, uncontro-
versial, and very much in line with what "[earlier] precedents
make clear."" 5
103. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (footnote and citations omitted).
104. Id. at 2537
105. Id.
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Admittedly, my interpretation of Blakely is not free of doubt,
and it may be that the Court intentionally cast doubt on the
Guidelines, as many other commentators seem to believe. °6 For
example, the fact that Blakely mentioned the term "statutory"
only occasionally might reflect an implicit view that any maxi-
mum, without a modifier, is constitutionally significant. Or that
same rhetoric could simply confirm that the Court's reasoning fo-
cused on the term "maximum." What is most important, however,
is to recognize that even if Blakely's two paragraphs were de-
signed to extend Apprendi to nonstatutory sentencing maxima,
that extension is not only obscure, but almost wholly unex-
plained.
Despite the Court's ambiguous language and absent analysis,
some have characterized Blakely as implicitly equating statutory
maxima and nonstatutory Guideline enhancements.0 7 At best,
that interpretation isolates the following sentences as dispositive:
"[T]he relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sen-
tence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the
maximum he may impose without any additional findings....
Had the judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis
of [Blakely's] plea, he would have been reversed."l0 8 It is beyond
dispute that federal judges, like Washington judges, must explain
their sentencing decisions, 10 9 and federal adjustments to or depar-
tures from the defendant's base offense level often rely on addi-
tional facts that are not elements of the crime of conviction.110
Furthermore federal judges, like Washington judges, cannot
make any decision at sentencing, including factual findings, with-
out explaining that decision's basis or the resultant sentence
could be reversed."'
106. See supra notes 1, 3-4 and accompanying text.
107. E.g., Booker, 375 F.3d at 513; United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 974 (9th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Medas, 323 F. Supp. 2d 436, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); United
States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (S.D. W. Va. 2004); United States v. Mont-
gomery, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 (D. Utah 2004); United States v. Croxford, 324 F.
Supp. 2d 1230, 1238-39 (D. Utah 2004).
108. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38.
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000) ("Statement of Reasons for Imposing a Sentence").
110. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § B1.3 ("Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine
the Guideline Range)").
111. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3) (2000) ("Review
of a sentence").
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Those similarities (explanation and appellate review), however,
cannot have controlling weight without overlooking three aspects
of the Blakely decision. First, with respect to text, although
Blakely's above-quoted passage purports to define "statutory
maximum," the Guidelines, as a set of nonstatutory sentencing
rules, necessarily fall outside any meaning of that term."' The
Guidelines are issued by the Sentencing Commission, an inde-
pendent entity in the judicial branch."' Like various rules of pro-
cedure and administrative regulations,1 4 such Guidelines are
submitted to Congress and may be disapproved." 5 Therefore, the
Guidelines do not comport with constitutional requirements of bi-
cameral passage and presentment and simply cannot be called
statutes. 116
112. I believe that base offense levels do not indicate the "maximum" sentence author-
ized by the jury's verdict, see infra Part IV.C, but it is, in any event, clear that they are not
statutory.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2000) ('There is established as an independent commission in the
judicial branch of the United States a United States Sentencing Commission.").
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000) ("Rules of procedure and evidence; submission to Con-
gress; effective date"); 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000) (providing for submission and considera-
tion of certain agency regulations).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 994(q) (2000).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. There is one possible exception to the rule that the
Guidelines are not statutory maxima. By enacting the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 ("PROTECT Act"), Pub. L.
108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) [hereinafter PROTECT Act], Congress altered several impor-
tant characteristics of the Guidelines. For example, the PROTECT Act eliminated certain
grounds upon which judges could "depart downward" from the Guidelines specified range;
the Act also granted more extensive appellate review, required reporting of district courts'
downward departures, and changed the Sentencing Commission's seven-person member-
ship from including "at least three judges" to including "no more than three judges." See,
e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Deciphering a Rosetta Stone of Sentencing Reform, 15 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 307 (2003); Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 310, 310, 314 (2003). One commentator has argued that those changes
render the guideline system sufficiently statutory, or at least sufficiently legislative, that
the entire system should be subject to Apprendi's procedural requirements. See Chanen-
son, supra note 4, at 23.
With respect to almost all of the PROTECT Act's provisions, I disagree that they affect
the relevant Apprendi analysis. The fact that Congress has by statute altered structural
elements of the Sentencing Commission, and has directed the Commission to revise non-
statutory rules, may render the Guidelines system more directly under legislative control
and less politically independent. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2000). But none of those alterations
converts any part of the overall system of nonstatutory Guidelines into an Act of Congress.
Even though the Guidelines, like other administrative rules, are authorized and enforced
by statute, that merely confirms that they function as "legislative rules adopted by federal
agencies." Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (emphasis added). It does not
signify that the Guidelines themselves are statutes.
By contrast, two provisions of the PROTECT Act did directly amend the Guidelines by
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If, as some suggest, Blakely effectively declares the Guidelines
unconstitutional, why would the Court use the term "statutory
maximum," as it has in every previous Apprendi case?117 Is there
any definition of "statutory" that could encompass nonstatutory
rules like the Guidelines?1i Is Justice Scalia in Blakely seeking
(somewhat out of character) to redefine statutory beyond its tra-
ditional, constitutional meaning?" 9 Is the term a mistake, a ves-
tige, or, in Judge Frank H. Easterbrook's, terms, "a chuckle at the
expense of other[s] ... who took them seriously and thought that
'statutory maximum' might have something to do with stat-
utes?"12 ° Undoubtedly, some would argue that the statutory char-
acter of a sentencing rule is unimportant under Apprendi.12' But
the moment one adopts such a theory, the term "statutory maxi-
mum" should be discarded, not defined. The majority opinion in
Blakely is not clear, but its language seems to indicate that the
Court has not gone that far.
statute. Each of those changes is indisputably statutory, regardless of their denomination
as Guidelines, and I believe that one of the two might qualify as a statutory maximum
governed by Apprendi. First, Congress assigned specific increases in a defendant's offense
level for trafficking and possessing images that involve sexual exploitation of minors. See
PROTECT Act § 401(i). Even though those increases are undeniably statutory, they do not
produce any maximum sentence and do not define any crime. See generally supra notes
17-32 and accompanying text (explaining how the Guidelines operate and how base of-
fense levels are modified). Thus, I believe that such enhancements should not be covered
by Apprendi.
Second, the PROTECT Act changed the base offense level for kidnaping under the
Guidelines section 2A4.1(a) from level twenty-four to level thirty-two. See PROTECT ACT
§ 104(a)(1). One could argue that Congress did not really set the maximum sentence, be-
cause the precise number of months to be imposed cannot be calculated without reference
to the Guidelines' Sentencing Table, GUIDELINES, ch. 5, pt. A, which is not statutory.
Nonetheless, in my view, Congress through this provision of the PROTECT Act statutorily
prescribed the maximum sentence that a defendant may receive for kidnaping. And that
statutory maximum operates just like the statutes enacted by New Jersey for unlawful
firearm possession or by Washington for second-degree kidnaping. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a),
(d) (2000) (prescribing a twenty-year statutory maximum for kidnaping). Even if that par-
ticular provision of the PROTECT Act constitutes a statutory maximum, however, there is
no basis for concluding that it somehow converts some or all other Guideline provisions
from nonstatutory submaximal sentencing rules to statutory maxima.
117. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 116 (discussing the PROTECT Act, and explaining why statutory
changes that manifest legislative control over the Guidelines do not change the Guidelines
themselves into "statutes").
119. Cf Booker, 375 F.3d at 514 (stating that Blakely "redefin[ed] 'statutory maxi-
mum'").
120. Id. at 518 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
121. See infra text accompanying notes 130-137 (responding to such views).
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Second, it is of no consequence to the Guidelines that Blakely
interpreted Apprendi to bar any sentence greater than that au-
thorized by the jury's verdict or by the facts reflected in that ver-
dict122 because Blakely does not explain what sentence a jury's
verdict authorizes.123 In issuing a guilty verdict, the jury finds
that the defendant committed all elements of a crime, and the
maximum punishment authorized by the jury's verdict is the
maximum attached to the crime of conviction. Before Blakely, it
was undisputed orthodoxy that a defendant convicted of bank
robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) was convicted of that statutory
offense, and that the jury's verdict constitutionally authorized any
sentence up to the twenty-year statutory maximum. 12' From that
perspective, the Guidelines, unlike Washington's statutory
scheme, would not affect the maximum sentence that a judge may
constitutionally impose. The Guidelines merely specify conditions
for imposing particular sentences below the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, although a sentencing judge may make additional
findings that alter a defendant's sentence, and the sentence may
be reversed if those findings are improper or misapplied,12 nei-
ther the findings, their effect, nor the risk of reversal are consti-
tutionally significant because the Guidelines do not authorize
judges to "inflict[ ] punishment that the jury's verdict alone does
not allow, "12 6 -punishment above the maximum, in the crime of
conviction.
Does Blakely invite us to rethink such premises, perhaps con-
cluding that federal crimes are defined by guideline base offense
levels, not statutes? Does Blakely hold that, if there is no jury
trial on amount, federal bank robbers are convicted of robbery
under Guidelines section 2B3.1(a), with a statutory maximum of
thirty-one to forty-one months, but if $200,000 was stolen, the de-
122. As the Court noted in Blakely,
Our precedents make clear.., that the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.... When a
judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury
has not found all the facts "which the law makes essential to the punish-
ment," and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
124 S. Ct. at 2537 (citations omitted).
123. Compare id. at 2537, with infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (describing
such issues as Apprendi's baseline problem).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2000). See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
126. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
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fendants should be indicted and tried for robbery under Guide-
lines section 2B3.1(b)(7)(C) with a higher maximum?2 7 To de-
scribe the Guidelines' base offense levels as statutory maxima
would, to say the least, radically revise the terminology of federal
criminal law. It would also transform current understandings of
the maximum sentence that is authorized by a federal jury's ver-
dict. 128
Although I will return to these issues in more detail, my pre-
sent point is only that, despite popular perceptions, Blakely did
not consider such questions and did not answer them. Instead,
the Court simply restated and applied Apprendi's rule that a
State may not define a crime (second-degree kidnaping) with one
maximum sentence (fifty-three months), yet allow a judge to im-
pose a greater sentence. 129 The fact that Washington and New
Jersey used markedly different forms, labels, and mechanisms to
implement their statutory maxima did not alter their statutes' ef-
fect, which was to create two separate crimes with two statutory
maxima. 3 ° Blakely's maximum was fifty-three months, not ten
years,' 3 ' just as Apprendi's maximum was ten years, not
twenty,132 and Ring's was life imprisonment, not death.133 Al-
127. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 20, at 3 (arguing that "the Sentencing Com-
mission has identified a multitude of new 'Guidelines crimes,' each a variant of one or
more statutory crimes"). See generally supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Guidelines' application to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)).
128. The problem is not simply that applying Apprendi to the Guidelines would create
and define maximum sentences for thousands of new crimes, where those Guideline provi-
sions were previously thought to specify particular sentences within the much smaller
field of statutory criminal prohibitions. The fact that a sentencing system might be com-
plex is no argument against applying Apprendi, and such arguments properly failed to
avail Washington in Blakely. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556.
129. Id. at 2537 ("[T]he relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a
judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without
any additional findings.").
130. Cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 ("'[L]abels do not afford an acceptable answer....
[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required finding expose
the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?"
(quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999))). Note that the effect at
issue is imposing "a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict."
Id. As shall be discussed, that statement does not deny that the jury's authorization is it-
self a formal concept. See infra Part III.C.
131. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534.
132. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468.
133. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597.
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though the Court's language varies slightly, the two-step logic in
each case is identical.
13 1
Third, it might seem particularly inapt to apply Blakely's am-
biguous language to the Guidelines because the majority explic-
itly stated that it "express[ed] no opinion" on that subject. 135
Pieces of the Blakely opinion, like pieces of Apprendi, doubtless
could be read to invalidate the Guidelines (and mandatory min-
ima as well). Nonetheless, the most defensible interpretation of
Blakely as a whole is, as the opinion's terms suggest, that the
Court merely reiterated and applied the reasoning that earlier
"precedents make clear" concerning a State's ability to impose
punishment greater than the crime of conviction's statutory maxi-
mum. 36 Those earlier precedents did not explain-in dicta or by
implication-whether the same principle should govern the non-
statutory Guidelines. Neither did Blakely.
C. The Perils of Court-Watching
To be sure, what many observers find interesting about Blakely
is not its legal significance, but its value as a signal of the Court's
future behavior in Booker. Blakely not only represents the Court's
most recent Apprendi analysis, but the decision also was au-
thored by Justice Scalia, whose vote will decide the Guidelines'
fate.137 Although one can seldom read the Court's collective mind,
Blakely at least does not reveal a Court overeager to invalidate
the Guidelines.
With some irony, the strongest basis for thinking that Blakely
undermines the Guidelines is the vehemence of the four dissent-
ing Justices.13 Indeed, Judge Posner cited Blakely's dissents and
the majority's brief response as affirmative evidence of the Guide-
lines' infirmity.3 9 Justice O'Connor's dissent was especially vocal
134. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534-43.
135. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9.
136. Id. at 2543.
137. Id. at 2534.
138. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer
dissented in Blakely. Id. at 2543-62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Booker, 375 F.3d at 511 ("The majority in Blakely, faced with dissenting opinions
that as much as said that the decision doomed the federal sentencing guidelines, might
have said, no it doesn't; it did not say that."); id. at 513 ("Justice Scalia, now speaking for a
majority of the Court, in Blakely, though he replied to the dissenting Justices at length,
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in rejecting the majority's claim that Blakely did not address the
Guidelines. Writing for herself and three colleagues, Justice
O'Connor repeatedly suggested that, whether intended or not,
Blakely implied that the Guidelines were unconstitutional. 4 ° In a
section that her colleagues did not join, Justice O'Connor's was
more dramatic:
It is no answer to say that today's opinion impacts only Washington's
scheme and not ... the Federal Guidelines. The fact that the Federal
Guidelines are promulgated by... the Judicial Branch is irrelevant
to the majority's reasoning....
[T]he Federal Guidelines, which require an increase in the sentenc-
ing range upon specified factual findings, will meet the same fate.
141
Other dissenting opinions were milder, but each expressed simi-
lar concern for the Guidelines' post-Blakely future.42
Given the Blakely majority's choice not to address the Guide-
lines, however, one might wonder why the dissents' predictions
matter much. After all, Blakely's dissidents are the same jurists
who disagreed with Apprendi itself and who at that time pre-
dicted that mandatory minima and determinate sentencing would
quickly be invalidated. 43 Especially because Blakely's dissents re-
iterate prior arguments that Apprendi held the Guidelines un-
constitutional, their predictions about the future warrant skepti-
cism.14 In Apprendi, the majority explicitly refused to address the
did not say that they were wrong to suggest that the federal sentencing guidelines could
not be distinguished from the Washington sentencing guidelines.").
140. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The legacy of today's opin-
ion, whether intended or not, will be the consolidation of sentencing power in the State
and Federal Judiciaries.") (emphasis added); id. at 2546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Under
the majority's approach, any fact that increases the upper bound on a judge's sentencing
discretion is an element of the offense."); id. at 2548-49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The
consequences of today's decision will be as far reaching as they are disturbing .... Numer-
ous other States have enacted guidelines systems, as has the Federal Government. To-
day's decision casts constitutional doubt over them all.") (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 2251 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, this case concerns the work of a
state legislature, and not of Congress. If anything, however, this distinction counsels even
greater judicial caution."); id. at 2561 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Until now, I would have
thought the Court might have limited Apprendi so that its underlying principle would not
undo sentencing reform efforts. Today's case dispels that illusion .... Perhaps the Court
will distinguish the Guidelines, but I am uncertain how.").
143. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
144. Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[fln light of the
adoption of determinate-sentencing schemes by many States and the Federal Government,
the consequences of the Court's ... rules in terms of sentencing schemes invalidated by
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Guidelines 145 and described the dissents as inaptly "treat[ing] us
to a lengthy disquisition on the benefits of determinate sentenc-
ing schemes, and the effect of [Apprendi] on the federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines." '146 Given the Apprendi Court's summary response
five years ago, it is predictable that the Court would only reply
briefly to the same arguments' rehearsal in Blakely.
Another reason that Blakely's dissenters might misperceive the
decision's scope is that the deciding vote in the pending guideline
cases (one way or another) will be Blakely's author, Justice
Scalia.'47 Few would rely too heavily on a Scalian dissent to pre-
dict the scope of a majority opinion by Justice O'Connor; in many
respects, no two justices are more different. To anticipate the
Court's behavior in controversial cases, it is often important to
identify the fifth swing vote and analyze the issues from that jus-
tice's perspective. Here, the situation differs from the norm
mainly because of the justice in question.
The Apprendi IBlakely majority-Stevens, Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg-do not typically vote together in close
cases, 148 and it is already clear that they do not agree on the na-
ture and sweep of Apprendi. The Court's decision in Harris v.
United States illustrates that the fifth, narrowest vote on such is-
sues is Justice Scalia's.'49 In Harris, the Court considered
whether Apprendi should apply to mandatory minima, and thus
whether McMillan v. Pennsylvania5 ° should be overruled. 5 ' Al-
though Justice Stevens's Apprendi opinion reserved the question,
his McMillan dissent suggested that he would have voted to
strike down mandatory minima.'52 Likewise, Justice Thomas's
today's decision will likely be severe."), and id. at 551-52, with cases cited supra note 41
(discussing cases upholding the Guidelines after Apprendi).
145. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n.21; accord Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9.
146. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n.21.
147. See infra notes 154-57.
148. During the 2000-2002 Terms, for example, those Justices did not vote together in
any of the Court's sixty-two decisions that were decided 5-4. See The Statistics, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 480, 485 (2003); The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 458 (2002); The Statistics,
115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 544 (2001).
149. See generally Harris, 536 U.S. at 545-72 (illustrating Justice Scalia's willingness
to join only Part III of a four-part plurality opinion).
150. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
151. Harris, 536 U.S. at 550.
152. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 95-104 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S. at 253
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("[I]n my view, a proper understanding of this principle encom-
passes facts that increase the minimum as well as the maximum permissible sen-
1184 [Vol. 39:1155
APPRENDIS LIMITS
concurrence, which the majority cited favorably, stated that Ap-
prendi's adverse "consequence ... [for] McMillan should be plain
enough."15 3 No one in the Apprendi majority disagreed with Jus-
tice Thomas's opinion, and Justice Scalia joined most of its analy-
sis except the section discussing McMillan.154 Nevertheless, the
fifth vote in Harris for preserving mandatory minima was Justice
Scalia, who forced the rest of Apprendi's majority into dissent.155
Justice Thomas noted in frustration that only a plurality of the
Court would even admit that Apprendi and Harris could be rec-
onciled.'56 Although Justice Scalia is apparently alone in thinking
that both Apprendi and Harris are correct, his is the vote that
matters most.
Later discussion will show Harris's importance to any theory of
Apprendi jurisprudence, 57 but even at a superficial level, Harris
helps explain why Blakely might read as it does. The Justice who
decided who would write the Court's opinion was Justice Stevens,
the majority's most senior member. In cases where the result
rests on an unstable majority, opinions are often assigned to the
Justice whose views are narrowest or most uncertain, thereby re-
ducing risks that the majority could splinter in reasoning. Such
assignments also mitigate the risk a swing voter might switch
sides, because judges sometimes are most committed to opinions
that they themselves have written. Justice Scalia's authorship of
Blakely fits that pattern. A similar signal is the lack of concurring
opinions in Blakely. On the one hand, that might indicate a con-
sensus among the majority that Justice Scalia's simple words
were enough. Or the five may have avoided discussing the Guide-
lines because, as a five-vote majority, there was nothing on which
all five could agree.
tence .... "). Indeed, it seems possible that Justice Stevens's opinion in Apprendi sub-
merged the Justice's own personal views in order to hold a fifth vote for the majority.
153. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 499, 519-23.
155. See Bibas, supra note 33, at 81 (observing that Justice Scalia's vote probably was
not motivated by stare decisis concerns).
156. Harris, 536 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Justice Breyer concurs in the
judgment but not the entire opinion of the Court .... This leaves only a minority of the
Court embracing the distinction between McMillan and Apprendi that forms the basis of
today's holding, and at least one Member explicitly continues to reject both Apprendi and
Jones.") (citations omitted).
157. See infra notes 214-38 and accompanying text.
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The Court knew that it could have written an opinion in
Blakely that would have resolved the Guidelines' constitutional
status. ,5 8 Yet the Court did not. Why? If the Court had wished to
decide the Guidelines' constitutionality in 2004, or any other year
after Apprendi, there was a large pool of defendants seeking cer-
tiorari on that issue. Why would the Court allow thousands of
federal sentences to be imposed, year after year, under conditions
that the majority viewed as fundamentally unlawful? Could
judges who care so much for jury rights care so little for remedy-
ing ongoing constitutional violations?" 9 More directly, why not
take a federal companion case if Blakely was intended to sound
the Guidelines' knell? Blakely's procedural history confirms that
the Court had ample opportunities to select a companion case if it
wished. Blakely's petition for certiorari was discussed at three of
the Court's conferences (September 29, October 10, and October
17, 2003); the respondent's merits brief was filed on January 23,
2004; argument was heard on March 23, 2004; and the Court's
opinion did not issue until June 24, 2004.160 Even if the Court had
somehow underestimated Blakely's relevance to the Guidelines
when certiorari was granted, there were several months when
that relationship was abundantly clear.16'
158. See infra Part III.A-IV.B (articulating two theories of Apprendi, neither of which
was mentioned in Blakely, that would invalidate the Guidelines). It is useful, but not suffi-
cient, to note that the Guidelines were not formally before the Court. Cf., e.g., Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982) (noting, in a case that involved the qualified immu-
nity of federal officials, not state officials, that "it would be 'untenable to draw a distinc-
tion for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under [42
U.S.C.] § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials'")
(second alteration in original) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
159. This is not an argument concerning the legal authority of the Court's denials of
certiorari. The Court has unrestrained discretion to deny review in any case where six
Justices are amenable to doing so; such denials of certiorari are nonprecedential and are
necessarily unsteady indicators of what the Court may choose to do in future cases. See,
e.g., ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 301 (8th ed. 2002). For example,
with respect to the Guidelines, there was no conflict among state or federal courts until
Blakely, and such conflict can often be an important factor in the decision to grant certio-
rari. See generally SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing such conflicts as, "neither controlling nor fully
measuring the Court's discretion, [but] indicat[ing] the character of the reasons the Court
considers"). My narrow point is simply that any four Justices who were especially eager or
aggressive in seeking to invalidate the Guidelines had abundant opportunity, and exigent
constitutional reason, to do so sooner rather than later.
160. See Supreme Court Docket, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/02-1632.
htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
161. Indeed, Justice Breyer's dissent stated that, given Blakely's effect on "tens of
thousands of criminal prosecutions, including federal prosecutions," he "would not proceed
further piecemeal" but rather "would call for further argument on the ramifications of the
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For those of us outside the Court's walls, such questions cannot
have clear answers. But they do illustrate that the strongest con-
clusion from Blakely's context confirms its ambiguous text: for
reasons known only to the Court, the majority deliberately opted
to resolve Blakely without explicitly or implicitly determining the
Guidelines' constitutionality. 162 Thus, as a matter of legal princi-
ple, Blakely was no earthquake; 16 3 it was at most a preliminary
tremor, and even to those with a prognosticator's eye, Blakely's
signs (as is often true) are robust chiefly in their ambiguity.
III. APPRENDI'S PRINCIPLE
Recognizing that Blakely neither decided nor implied a decision
regarding the Guidelines opens the door for a fresh analysis of
Apprendi rights and what they should mean for federal sentenc-
ing. Also, as a base practical matter, if the Booker Court invali-
dates the Guidelines, Part II shows that Blakely and its predeces-
sors provide no articulated support for that decision regarding
nonstatutory sentencing rules.
This Part takes the next step, looking beyond Blakely for prin-
cipled guidance. To understand whether Apprendi should require
indictment and jury trial for facts that enhance sentences above
nonstatutory baselines, one must develop a solid view of Apprendi
itself. Justice Scalia and other members of the Court have divided
and oscillated in their descriptions of Apprendi rights. And al-
though academics have generated substantial work concerning
the history and consequences of Apprendi's progeny,1" fewer have
concerns [he had] raised .... [T]hat was not the Court's view." Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2562
(Breyer, J., dissenting). It bears note that a decision to take a federal companion case
would have required only four votes, although a vote for reargument would have required
five. See STERN ET AL., supra note 159, at 732.
162. There are those, including Justices O'Connor and Breyer, who might criticize the
Court for invalidating Blakely's state sentence without addressing the important ques-
tions that arise under the federal system. See O'Connor Disgusted, supra note 50; Blakely,
124 S. Ct. at 2562 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Such criticism must yield somewhat if Blakely's silence was due to frictions among the
five-Justice majority. Although much is made of the federal system's current chaos, cir-
cumstances would almost certainly have been worse if the Court had considered the
Guidelines' constitutionality and failed to produce a majority opinion altogether.
163. 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. (titling the volume "The Blakely Earthquake").
164. See, e.g., supra notes 4, 31; Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues
of Federalism as a Structural Limit on Errors, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003);
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attempted a broad theoretical account of Apprendi rights,165 and
almost no one has done so after Harris,1 66 which significantly
changed the relevant landscape. Thus, for context's sake, before
exploring my own view of Apprendi rights, I will consider two
competing theories and explain why they seem unconvincing.
A. A Model of Substantive Rights
The first theory, which could be called a "substantive interpre-
tation" of Apprendi, would assign the jury a primary role in de-
termining the actual amount of punishment a defendant receives.
For such a theory, juries would find beyond a reasonable doubt all
facts that deprive the defendant of any marginal increment of lib-
erty, and defendants would be protected against the judicial
power to impose any punishment without resort to a jury's find-
ings.
No jurist has endorsed such a strong vision of Apprendi rights,
though its intuitive attractiveness derives from a practical focus
on what matters to defendants in the real world. For the jury's
finding of guilt to be inextricably connected with the actual level
of punishment imposed 67 would maintain a "necessary link be-
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2004);
Joshua A. T. Fairfield, To Err is Human: The Judicial Conundrum of Curing Apprendi
Error, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 889 (2003); Michael Goldsmith, Reconsidering the Constitution-
ality of Guidelines After Blakely: A Former Commissioner's Perspective, 2004 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 935 (2004); Erik Lilliquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings
About Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. REV. 621 (2004); Marcia G. Shein & Matthew Doherty, The
Guidelines: A Troubling Historical Perspective, 51 FED. LAW. 30 (2004).
165. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1331-35 (2002); John 0.
McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social
Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 487 (2002); B. Patrick Costello, Jr., Comment, Apprendi v. New
Jersey: "Who Decides What Constitutes A Crime?" An Analysis of Whether A Legislature Is
Constitutionally Free to "Allocate" An Element of An Offense to An Affirmative Defense or A
Sentencing Factor Without Judicial Review, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1205 (2002).
166. But cf. J. Nancy Gertner, What Has Harris Wrought, 15 FED. SENTENCE REP. 83
(2002); Hendrix, supra note 41; Jane A. Dall, Note, "A Question for Another Day": The
Constitutionality of the U.S. Guidelines Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1617 (2003).
167. Cf. Harris, 536 U.S. at 576 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Why, after all, would anyone
care if they were convicted of murder, as opposed to manslaughter, but for the increased
penalties for the former offense, which in turn reflect the greater moral opprobrium soci-
ety attaches to the act?").
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tween punishment and crime," 6 ' and would effectively assign the
jury responsibility for determining both. Arguably, without such a
firm relationship between verdict and sentence, the jury's role in
the criminal decisional process would lose importance.'69 Addi-
tionally, a strong link between guilt and punishment would serve
a defendant's interest in providing notice, because the factual
elements found by the jury must also appear in the indictment. 7 °
In operative terms, a substantive interpretation of Apprendi
would find a constitutional violation whenever the jury's verdict
rests on one set of facts, but the defendant's sentence is, in any
part, based on different facts found by a judge. As should be clear,
the substantive interpretation would invalidate the Guidelines
because many defendants' sentences are affected by judges' inde-
pendent, postconviction determinations.' 7 '
Despite its simplicity and attention to real-world punishment,
judges and scholars have not advocated the substantive interpre-
tation because it contradicts the United States's history of judicial
fact-finding. Although some early criminal laws set fixed punish-
ments for criminal conduct,'72 many statutes have used a discre-
tionary sentencing system,'73 under which a jury's verdict deter-
mines guilt and the judge assigns any sentence within a broad
range specified by the statutory crime of conviction.' 74
168. Id.
169. Cf. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243-44 ("If a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to
life on a nonjury determination, the jury's role would correspondingly shrink from the sig-
nificance usually carried by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level
gatekeeping: in some cases, a jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 15-year sen-
tence would merely open the door to a judicial finding sufficient for life imprisonment.").
170. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring) (proposing that "elements"
subject to indictment and jury trial should identify all facts necessary to impose a particu-
lar "kind, degree, or range of punishment").
171. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (explaining how sentencing under
the Guidelines typically operates).
172. See, e.g., An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States,
ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978) ("In the early
days of the Republic .... [e]ach crime had its defined punishment.").
173. Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
1247, 1248-49 (1997); see also Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 7, 22, 1 Stat. 112, 113, 117
(authorizing a sentence for manslaughter of up to three years' imprisonment and fines up
to $1000, and authorizing a sentence for obstruction of process of up to one year and $300).
174. By contrast, the term "determinate sentencing" refers to any sentencing scheme
where the statutory sentencing range available to defendants convicted of the same crime
is subdivided by rule. The Guidelines are the paradigmatic example of determinate sen-
tencing; even they, however, allow for judicial discretion within the sentencing range pre-
scribed by the sentencing table (e.g., forty-one to fifty-one months).
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The Supreme Court discussed the constitutionality of discre-
tionary sentencing in Williams v. New York.'75 The Court ex-
plained that, unlike juries, which are limited by heightened evi-
dentiary burdens and deciding the narrow issue of guilt, the
sentencing judge in a discretionary system is allowed "to deter-
mine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt
has been determined. Highly relevant-if not essential-to his se-
lection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant's life and charac-
teristics."7 ' "[Bloth before and since the American colonies be-
came a nation, . . . a sentencing judge could exercise a wide dis-
cretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in
determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed
within limits fixed by law" in defining the crime of conviction.'77
Under discretionary sentencing, judges consider numerous facts
other than the crime of conviction's elements, including the de-
fendant's socially valuable projects, apparent malice, projected
recidivism, penitence, prior criminal acts, and much else.178 Each
or all of those facts could form indispensable, legally authorized
components of a judge's decision to impose an increased sentence,
and none of them has any necessary relationship to facts found by
the jury in issuing its verdict.' 79
Although the above text focuses on discretionary sentencing by judges, similar problems
arise in the context of indeterminate sentencing, whereunder the judge specifies a possible
range of sentences for the defendant, but the actual time of release is set by executive pa-
role officers based on rehabilitation. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 20, at
18-22 (describing the history and function of the federal parole system, which existed from
1910 until the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
175. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). The defendant in Williams was convicted of murder, and al-
though the jury recommended a life sentence, the judge imposed the death penalty based
on "the shocking details of the crime," the defendant's "thirty other [unconvicted] burglar-
ies," his "morbid sexuality," and his "menace to society." Id. at 244.
176. Id. at 247; accord id. at 251 ("In determining whether a defendant shall receive
a ... sentence, we do not think the Federal Constitution restricts the view of the sentenc-
ing judge to the information received in open court. The due process clause should not be
treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial
procedure.").
177. Id. at 246 (footnote omitted).
178. Id. at 250 n.15 (outlining the Administrative Office's form probation report, which
included information regarding the defendant's "(1) Offense; (2) Prior Record; (3) Family
History; (4) Home and Neighborhood; (5) Education; (6) Religion; (7) Interests and Activi-
ties; (8) Health (physical and mental); (9) Employment; (10) Resources; (11) Summary; (12)
Plan; and (13) Agencies Interested").
179. Some might question whether the logic of Williams remains valid today. The
Court supported the need for individualized sentences in part by reference to the then-
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To see discretionary sentencing's details, imagine a bank rob-
ber who pleads guilty to an offense with a statutory sentence of
five years to life. In supporting the plea bargain, the prosecution
proves only (as the hypothetical statute requires) that the defen-
dant forcibly removed money from a bank. At sentencing, how-
ever, the prosecution offers evidence that the defendant used a
machine gun, took hostages, tried to kill a security guard, and
had previously committed several similar robberies. °80 Imagine
that the sentencing judge's opinion explains that five to seven
years would have been appropriate in a garden variety bank rob-
bery, but this crime's seriousness deserved more. Moreover, imag-
ine the judge's on-record calculation that, as a general rule in her
courtroom, any robbery involving a hostage warrants at least fif-
teen years, any attempted machine gunning earns an additional
ten years, and the defendant's criminal history merits six years
more. Our hypothetical defendant is thus sentenced to thirty-
eight years imprisonment-thirty-one years above what the judge
would have imposed without her additional findings and sentenc-
ing rules-based largely on facts that were never presented in the
indictment, found by a jury, or proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Nonetheless, under well-established modern doctrine, there is no
Apprendi problem in sight.11
Discretionary sentencing's strong historical pedigree rebuts
any claim that the Constitution requires a detailed, active role for
prevalent goals of punishment: "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the
criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of
criminal jurisprudence." Id. at 248. However, the fact that federal sentencing no longer
adheres to reformation and rehabilitation is irrelevant to the constitutional permissibility
of individualized sentences. Although retribution and incapacitation now represent more
modem goals of punishment, those penological theories also may require the use of broad
contextual facts in determining a particular defendant's sentence. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
3661 (2000) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.").
180. To complete the scenario, one could also imagine evidence that the defendant was
a recovered drug abuser, who was a decorated military veteran of the first Iraq War, and
was so repentant of her crime that she had become a strong participant and role model in
antidrug and anticrime organizations. To incorporate such mitigating facts would not alter
any of the text's conclusions.
181. Cf. Harris, 536 U.S. at 560 (plurality opinion) ("It does not matter, for the pur-
poses of the constitutional analysis, that... the 'State provides' that a fact 'shall give rise
both to a special stigma and to a special punishment.' Judges choosing a sentence within
the range do the same, and '[j]udges, it is sometimes necessary to remind ourselves, are
part of the State.'") (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted)).
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juries in sentencing. There is no serious question that the Consti-
tution allows defendants to be convicted of a crime with a broad
statutory range, and the Constitution allows judges under discre-
tionary sentencing to impose any sentence within that range
based on facts, proved by a preponderance of evidence, that are
not elements of the offense. A judge's jury-free sentencing discre-
tion would persist even if she explicitly recited factual findings to
support her chosen sentence, 1 2 or if the judge chose to apply a
routine sentence in all cases without aggravating evidence at sen-
tencing. Indeed, all judges within a jurisdiction could choose, in
their individual discretion, to use the same routine sentence and
the same grounds for imposing a larger sentence. 8 3 Even in rela-
tively formal, systematic incarnations, discretionary sentencing
remains constitutionally valid.
The fact that discretionary sentencing is not only permissible,
but incontestably permissible, must temper the norms typically
offered to support Apprendi's rule. Although it is commonplace to
say that juries must find "'every fact which is legally essential to
the punishment [imposed],"" 4 for example, this statement means
less than it seems. For defendants, the phrase "legally essential"
greatly limits Apprendi's practical import.185 Defendants wish to
182. Under pre-Guidelines discretionary sentencing, it was "'firmly established.., that
the appellate court ha[d] no control over a sentence which [was] within the limits allowed
by a statute.'" Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441 (1974) (quoting Gurera v.
United States, 40 F.2d 388, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930)); id. ("[11f a judge imposed a sentence
within that range, his exercise of discretion ... was not subject to challenge [on appeal].");
id. at 440 n.14 ("[T]he 'discretion of the judge.., in [sentencing] matters [was] virtually
free of substantive control or guidance.'") (first alteration in original) (quoting Sanford H.
Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Process, 75 HARV. L. REV.
904, 916 (1962).
183. In 1958, Congress attempted a voluntary solution to sentencing disparities. Under
28 U.S.C. § 334(a), Congress authorized the creation of judicial sentencing councils and
institutes under the Judicial Conference. Such entities were designed to formulate "objec-
tives, policies, standards, and criteria for sentencing," 28 U.S.C. § 334(a), which might
lead sentencing judges toward "a desirable degree of consensus as to the types of sentences
which should be imposed," S. REP. No. 85-2013 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3891, 3892. Such advisory institutions were widely viewed as insufficient to control dis-
parities in criminal punishment. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 80, at 61-68; Irving R.
Kaufman, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 257, 270 (1962). But no one ever sug-
gested that the institutes and councils would have been unconstitutional if all federal
judges had chosen the sentencing standards thus promulgated.
184. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 n.5 (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50-56 (2d ed. 1872)); accord Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
476-83, 489-90 n.15.
185. Cf. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248 ("It is not, of course, that anyone today would claim that
every fact with a bearing on sentencing must be found by a jury; we have resolved that
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know the sentence they will receive if convicted. Their interest in
knowing a hypothetical sentence that they might receive is de-
rivative, regardless of whether such data are presented as a
maximum, a minimum, or a range. Notice of a statutory maxi-
mum is nearly worthless if all sentences are imposed far below
that maximum, notice of a minimum is likewise empty if actual
sentences lie well above it, and knowledge of one's range of pun-
ishment is useful only if that range is small, or if one knows the
distribution of sentences therein.
1 86
Under discretionary sentencing, to convict a defendant of a
crime with a broad statutory range is merely preliminary to the
sentencing phase, where more important decisions are made re-
garding the defendant's actual punishment.8 7 For our hypotheti-
cal bank robber,18 the jury's verdict, and the facts proffered to
support her guilty plea, yielded little information or notice about
the actual sentence imposed. The practical details of punishment
were knowable only based on the evidence offered by the prosecu-
tion, the judge's findings, and any rule-based or discretionary de-
cisions by the court at sentencing. In sum, although a defendant's
interest in avoiding significant judicial sentence enhancements
may tend to support the existence of Apprendi rights, discretion-
ary sentencing shows that it is not a value that defines those
rights. Indeed, if the Supreme Court were to adopt some variant
of the substantive theory, the legal consequences could be im-
mense. Not only would the Guidelines fall, but even discretionary
sentencing, which has been a longstanding hallmark of United
States sentencing law, would be suspect.8 9
B. A Model of Judicial Discretion
A more sophisticated theory for invalidating the Guidelines ap-
pears in Justice Thomas's Apprendi concurrence (which Justice
general issue and have no intention of questioning its resolution.").
186. For additional criticism of notice as a driving value in Apprendi jurisprudence, see
King & Klein, supra note 31, at 1485-86.
187. Cf. id. at 1509 ("[In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries came the
continued decline of mandatory penalties in favor of judicial discretion to set sentences
within a range set by the legislature. For such crimes, jurors [and defendants] could only
guess what sentence would follow [the] conviction.") (footnote omitted).
188. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text.
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Scalia joined in part)190 and his Harris dissent (which Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined).191 Unlike the substantive
theory of Apprendi, Justice Thomas would embrace discretionary
sentencing, but in so doing, he must depart from the practical
consequences that matter most to criminal defendants. Instead,
Justice Thomas's model centers on the range of available pun-
ishment, i.e., the scope of judicial discretion that applies at sen-
tencing. That judicial-discretion model guards defendants only
against adverse sentencing decisions that occur pursuant to rules.
1. Apprendi's Concurrence92
190. Apprendi, 503 U.S. at 499-524 (Thomas, J., concurring).
191. Harris, 536 U.S. at 572-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192. As a brief note on methodology, Justice Thomas's Apprendi opinion relies heavily
on historical materials that were not compiled in any brief or modern scholarship. That
history is not analyzed in detail here, because it provides neither a theoretical account of
Apprendi rights, nor direct answers concerning the Guidelines' constitutionality. Nonethe-
less, one should mention that Justice Thomas's overall characterization of the record is
overstated: "A long line of essentially uniform authority ... stretching from the earliest
reported cases after the founding until well into the 20th century, establishes that the
original understanding of which facts are elements was even broader than the rule [re-
garding statutory maxima] that the Court adopts today." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Tho-
mas, J., concurring). In Harris, the Solicitor General indicated several flaws in Justice
Thomas's analysis concerning mandatory minima, Brief for the United States at 32-36,
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 524 (2002) (No. 00-10666), and Justice Thomas did not
respond to those criticisms or reassert his argument's historical merit. E.g., Harris, 536
U.S. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("According to the plurality, the historical practices
underlying [Apprendi] ... do not support extension... to facts that increase a defendant's
mandatory minimum sentence. Such fine distinctions with regard to vital constitutional
liberties cannot withstand close scrutiny."); id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Looking to
the principles that animated the decision in Apprendi and the bases for the historical prac-
tice upon which Apprendi rested (rather than to the historical pedigree of mandatory mini-
mums), there are no logical grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory minimums
any differently than facts that increase the statutory maximum.") (emphasis added).
Moreover, Justice Thomas's reliance on statements from late-nineteenth century trea-
tises, which did not identify federal constitutional differences between jury-bound ele-
ments and judicial sentence enhancements, seems at least suspect as evidence to confirm
founding-era understandings. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 510-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50 (2d ed. 1872), 1 JOEL
PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 49 (4th ed. 1895), 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP
COMMENTARIES ON CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 1872)); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 54 (stating, without explanation,
that judicial consideration of aggravating factors to increase a defendant's sentence "is an
entirely different thing from punishing one for what is not alleged against him"). Even if
the Constitution did incorporate established principles of common-law history, all of Jus-
tice Thomas's common-law authorities concerning his "broader" interpretation of Ap-
prendi's rule regarding statutory maxima arise decades after the Bill of Rights' ratifica-
tion. Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 502-03 (discussing Commonwealth v. Smith, 1 Mass.
245 (1804), which concerned a statutory maximum), with id. at 502-06 (discussing cases
from the 1840s through the 1870s), and id. at 507 (discussing Commonwealth v. Welsh, 4
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Justice Thomas described the fundamental question in Ap-
prendi as "what constitutes a 'crime.""93 In turn, he defined
"crime" by reference to "elements," which include "every fact that
is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment .... One
need only look to the kind, degree, or range of punishment to
which the prosecution is by law entitled for a given set of facts.
Each fact necessary for that entitlement is an element."' 94
Justice Thomas's definition thus uses two phrases to describe
the same idea. Under one iteration, Justice Thomas would re-
quire jury trial for any fact that is "by law a basis for ... increas-
ing punishment."1 95 Of course, the term "by law" has a special
meaning in this context,1 96 because Justice Thomas would not in-
validate any discretionary sentencing systems.197 Justice Thomas,
instead, views Apprendi as providing a limited right against de-
terminate sentencing enhancements, that is, a right against pro-
visions that attach punishment to facts by rule, not as a matter of
unchanneled discretion. The Guidelines would be invalid under a
judicial-discretion model because statutory and nonstatutory
Va. 57 (1817), which concerned a statutory maximum, and Smith v. Commonwealth, 14
Serg. & Rawle 69 (Pa. 1826), which addressed no issue relevant to Apprendi), and id. at
507-19 (discussing cases from the 1840s through the 1960s). For more extended substan-
tive discussion of Justice Thomas's historical materials, see Bibas, supra note 33, at 79,
King & Klein, supra note 31, at 1474-77, and Priester, supra note 41 at 910-11.
193. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring); Harris, 536 U.S. at 575 (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting).
194. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring); accord, e.g., id. at 502 ("[A]
fact that is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment is an element."); id. at
506 ("[If a statute increased the punishment of a common-law crime.., based on some
fact, then that fact must be charged in the indictment in order for the court to impose the
increased punishment."); id. at 508 (noting that a "fact is an element because it increases
the punishment by law"); id. at 510 ("[T]he indictment must... contain an averment of
every particular thing which enters into the punishment.") (alterations in original) (quot-
ing 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 192, at §
540); id. at 515 ("[A] crime includes any fact to which punishment attaches."); id. at 521
("If a fact is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment-for establishing or
increasing the prosecution's entitlement-it is an element.").
195. Id. at 501-02; see, e.g., id. at 521 (describing elements of a crime as any fact that
by law is the basis for punishment).
196. Cf. supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (interpreting "legally essential" in
a similar fashion).
197. Thus, Justice Thomas differentiates between Apprendi's rule concerning "what the
Constitution requires the prosecution to do in order to entitle itself to a particular kind,
degree, or range of punishment," and "constitutional constraints [that] apply.., to the
imposition of punishment within the limits of that entitlement." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520
(Thomas, J., concurring). From the defendant's point of view, however, the dominant simi-
larity between the two is that each can result in a longer term of imprisonment.
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rules affect judges' discretion the same; that is why several Jus-
tices have described the Guidelines as "hav[ing] the force and ef-
fect of laws."19
To focus on any increase in punishment by law creates three
problems. First, it is not clear as a normative matter why the
Constitution should greater protect defendants subject to rule-
based sentencing than it does defendants subject to discretion-
based sentencing. Imagine two judges, one operating in a discre-
tionary sentencing jurisdiction and the other using the Guide-
lines, who confront identical defendants convicted of identical
statutory crimes. The two might impose the same sentence, rely
on the same factual findings, use the same postconviction evi-
dence to prove the same uncharged conduct, and apply the same
evidentiary standards. Under a judicial-discretion model, the dis-
cretionary scheme's sentence would be upheld, but the guidelines
sentence would be struck down.
From the two defendants' perspective, that result is anomalous
because the loss of liberty in each case is the same, and so are the
factual findings that produce such loss. Moreover, each system
seems to incorporate an equally limited role for the jury as a
gatekeeper over the defendant's punishment. '99 Why should the
Constitution treat the two sentencing regimes differently? How
can it be that discretionary sentencing better comports with due
process and jury trial rights? Neither Justice Thomas nor his
academic supporters have addressed such questions, and no in-
herent danger in punishment by law-by rule-appears that
would merit special constitutional safeguards.
Second, a judicial-discretion model like Justice Thomas's may
be hard-pressed to determine what types of sentencing rules
might violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. For example,
198. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); accord United States v.
Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 160 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(2000) (providing that a district court, except in cases of child crimes and sexual offenses,
"shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in [the Guidelines]
unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines").
199. Cf. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243-44 ("If a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to
life on a nonjury determination, the jury's role would correspondingly shrink from the sig-
nificance usually carried by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level
gatekeeping.. ").
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does the difference between permissible discretion and impermis-
sible rules turn on the relevant norm's content or origin?200 Imag-
ine the following scenarios for a bank robber with a statutory sen-
tencing range of five years to life: (1) An individual judge imposes
a sentence of thirty-eight years. (2) The judge explains that her
"normal" sentence for bank robbery is five to seven years, but this
defendant's violent and dangerous conduct deserves thirty-eight
years. (3) The judge explains that, in her court, she always im-
poses fifteen years above "normal" for crimes with hostages, ten
years for crimes with attempted machine gunning, and six years
for defendants with multiple prior offenses; thus, this defendant
receives thirty-eight years. (4) The judge imposes a thirty-eight-
year sentence, explaining that every court in the jurisdiction, in-
cluding hers, follows the above system, with narrowly defined ex-
ceptions for extraordinary circumstances. (5) The system of rules
is promulgated by a group of judges, who enforce it upon one an-
other through ordinary appellate channels. (6) A congressionally
organized Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch issues
the rules.
Option (1) is a clearly valid application of ordinary discretion-
ary sentencing,20 1 but beyond that, it is hard to see where any
useful line might lie. If Justice Thomas's "Apprendi right" is one
that guarantees purely individualized sentencing, (2) or (3) might
be invalid. If the right protects individual judges' discretion, ag-
gregation under (4) or (5) might be problematic.20 2 If judges are
allowed to surrender their discretion, problems might emerge
only when Congress institutionally structures discretion under
(6). There are plausible policy arguments for each or all of the
above distinctions. Such incidents of organization and operation,
however, seem remote from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments'
predominant concerns, and no jurist has sought to explain why
constitutional rights should turn on seemingly minor details.20 3
200. Cf H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 1994) (describing legal rules
based on their content and function); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-95 (Max
Knight trans., 2d ed. 1970) (identifying legal rules by their structural relationship to a ba-
sic norm); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 1-2 (2d ed. 1980) (characterizing the four problems under any
systematic theory of law as existence, identity, structure, and content).
201. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
202. Cf. supra note 183 (discussing judicial councils and institutes under 28 U.S.C. §
334(a)).
203. Cf. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's
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As an alternative to content- or origin-based criteria for rules, a
judicial-discretion theory might look to identify certain enforce-
ment mechanisms that give sentencing rules their impermissibly
mandatory character. Four possibilities appear. One would turn
on legislative labels, such that the Guidelines would be valid if
they were literally rephrased as persuasive authority but were
otherwise kept the same. A second would focus on appellate re-
view, invalidating any regime where the sentencing judge could
be reversed for imposing a sentence outside the rules;2 °4 thus, the
Guidelines could be saved if Congress maintained their manda-
tory tone but repealed only the provision for appellate review.20 5
After such amendment, the Guidelines would lack any enforce-
ment other than the sentencing judge's oath and conscience.
Would such formally unenforceable, but technically mandatory,
guidelines qualify as unconstitutional restrictions on judicial sen-
tencing discretion?
A third approach would count even informal coercion as a
source of rules. Possible examples include a system where adher-
ence to hortatory Guidelines are a litmus test for confirmation
hearings, and judges' noncompliant decisions are reported to
Congress for criticism.2 6 Congress also might require judges to
proffer detailed explanations to justify departures from otherwise
persuasive Guidelines. Such political and bureaucratic coercion
rule as imposing unnecessary constitutional hurdles "simply because it is the legislature,
rather than the judge, that constrains the extent to which [various] facts may be used to
impose a sentence within a pre-existing statutory range").
204. This view that reversal is constitutionally significant might find support in
Blakely's definition of a statutory maximum, 124 S. Ct. at 2537, which is discussed above.
See supra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000) ("Review of a Sentence").
206. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 476 (requiring a semiannual report to Congress of certain delayed
matters on each judge's docket). The PROTECT Act, see supra note 116, exemplifies the
political possibility of informal coercion. Section 401(h) requires the chief judge of each fed-
eral district to report and to explain every sentence issued within her district that departs
from the otherwise applicable Guidelines range. The "identity of the sentencing judge"
must also be included in those reports. Id.; cf PROTECT Act, supra note 116, §
401(1)(2)(B)(iii) (providing for reports by the Attorney General concerning departures, also
including "the identity of the district court judge"). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in remarks to
a group of federal judges, noted the potential force of the PROTECT Act's reporting re-
quirements: "[Tihe collection of such information on an individualized judge-by-judge ba-
sis ... could amount to an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to intimidate individual
judges in the performance of their judicial duties." Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of
the Chief Justice to the Federal Judges Ass'n Bd. of Directors Mtg. (May 5, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-05-05-03.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
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might seem trivial in some circumstances, but in others they
could easily mimic the force of substantive appellate review.
Finally, one might identify rules by looking directly at their
practical effects. Under that approach, it might be important
whether every judge in fact follows the Guidelines, regardless of
how the rules are phrased or enforced. No one can know whether
any or all of the above factors would be relevant in Justice Tho-
mas's assessment of whether a rule has impermissibly restricted
judicial discretion. But it is at least certain that, if the Court
adopted a judicial-discretion model as authoritative, future cases
might render the model's practical details almost as difficult to
identify as its normative basis." 7
A final problem with Justice Thomas's proposed rule against
rule-bound sentence enhancements is his failure to explain how
such principles relate to the jury's verdict. In general terms, this
could be called Apprendi's "baseline problem."2 8 Every increase
must be an increase above some baseline, and the constitutional
standard prescribed by Apprendi is the sentence authorized by
the jury's verdict.0 9 Although Justice Thomas seems to assume
that any rule-bound fact that boosts punishment above a judi-
cially normal sentence is an increased sentence,210 that assump-
tion is controversial and undefended. Because the judicial-
discretion model does not indicate how to determine the maxi-
mum sentence authorized by a jury's verdict, nor why the jury's
authorization should turn on a sentencing judge's range of discre-
207. A slightly different possibility would be to interpret Justice Thomas's phrase "by
law" not as a standard against rules, but only against rules that contain legislatively
specified content. One might then argue that aggravators in a discretionary system are
not a basis for increasing a sentence by law, because the judge is allowed to choose which
types of conduct warrant additional punishment. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 51 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Blakely's lesson is otherwise. There, the Court easily and correctly held that a
legislature cannot escape Apprendi's rule by failing to specify which particular facts au-
thorize a sentence above the statutory maximum: "Whether the judge's authority to im-
pose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specific fact (as in Apprendi), one of sev-
eral specified facts (as in Ring), or any aggravating fact (as here), it remains the case that
the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence." Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538.
208. See infra Part III.C for further discussion.
209. See supra note 63-64 and accompanying text.
210. For arguments that the proper baseline for determining what a jury's verdict au-
thorizes is the statutory maximum of the crime of conviction, see supra notes 194-208 and
accompanying text. But cf. Bibas, supra note 31, at 1134 n.249, 1182-83 (claiming that the
jury's verdict does not authorize any particular amount of punishment).
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tion, its standard for increasing punishment lacks a necessary
component.
Justice Thomas's alternate definition of Apprendi rights would
attach constitutional safeguards to any fact that increases the
"punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled for a
given set of facts." '' Those words seem unhelpful, however, be-
cause one cannot discern what prosecutorial entitlement means
in this context. For example, how could the prosecution be enti-
tled to any level of punishment other than the sentence that a
particular defendant deserves, i.e., the sentence that the judge
actually imposes in an individual case? That sense of entitlement
cannot be what Justice Thomas has in mind, however, because
the United States's history of discretionary sentencing allows
judges, not only juries, to determine particular sentences in par-
ticular cases.212 The prosecution's entitlement must refer not to
the actual amount of punishment that a defendant receives, but
to the permissible range of punishment available as a matter of
judicial discretion. Therefore, under both iterations, Justice Tho-
mas's definition of elements implicitly characterizes Apprendi
rights as incorporating a basic opposition to sentencing rules and
a corresponding preference for judicial discretion. That viewpoint
poses serious problems as a matter of principle and practical rea-
son alike.213
2. Harris's Dissent
Although Justice Thomas's theory concerning the significance
of a range of punishment initially appeared in a part of his Ap-
prendi concurrence that no other Justice joined, the theory was
importantly clarified by his discussion of mandatory minima in
Harris.214 The Harris dissent merits special attention because, in
being joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, it best ar-
211. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
212. See id. at 472-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (accepting that practice as valid).
213. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
214. Incidentally, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Apprendi's precursor, Jones v.
United States, also seemed to endorse a range-based analysis: "[Ilt is unconstitutional to
remove from the jury the assessment of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed
range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." Jones, 526 U.S. at 253
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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ticulates the views of those Justices who will probably vote to in-
validate the Guidelines in Booker.
Mandatory minima posed a difficult, and ultimately divisive,
issue for Apprendi's majority. On one hand, the practical effects of
mandatory minima argued against their constitutionality; for
many crimes and defendants, to change the statutory minimum
would yield a much higher sentence than would a changed maxi-
mum. Also, an altered minimum affects the lowest and least cul-
pable stratum of criminal defendants, who tend to inspire greater
sympathy, while maxima are significant only for the most culpa-
ble criminals, who have been judged to deserve extraordinarily
long sentences. If Apprendi had held that juries should find all
important components of a defendant's sentence, modern minima
would almost certainly qualify.215 But we have seen that Apprendi
cannot require all important facts to be found by the jury without
invalidating discretionary sentencing. 16 Where a statutory range
is broad, the sentencing judge's factual findings and judgments
are often the most important determinant of the defendant's sen-
tence, yet such findings are valid even though their factual bases
may not be alleged in an indictment or proved to a jury.217
215. At least one scholar has explicitly argued that the Court's decision to uphold man-
datory minima in Harris is inconsistent with both Apprendi and Blakely. See Barkow, su-
pra note 4, at 312 ("There is little logic to support the coexistence of Harris and Blakely.
Facts that trigger a heightened maximum sentence and those that dictate a heightened
minimum sentence both seem to fall under the rationale of Apprendi.").
[Hiow does the jury act as any more of a circuit-breaker against the machin-
ery of the state if it makes a determination that the defendant committed
some generally described behavior that could theoretically yield a maximum
sentence, but, in fact, the defendant's sentence is determined by "a judicial
inquisition into the facts of the crime the State actually seeks to punish" with
a mandatory minimum sentence?... [Alt the very least, the jury must apply
all laws that dictate punishment on the basis of particular factual findings,
regardless of whether that punishment alters a floor or a ceiling.
Id. at 313; accord Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitu-
tional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 106-16 (2003).
216. Cf. Harris, 536 U.S. at 549 ("After the accused is convicted, the judge may impose
a sentence within a range provided by statute, basing it on various facts relating to the
defendant and the manner in which the offense was committed. Though these facts may
have a substantial impact on the sentence, they are not elements, and are thus not subject
to the Constitution's indictment, jury, and proof requirements.").
217. Id. at 562 (plurality opinion) ("Judges... have always considered uncharged 'ag-
gravating circumstances' that, while increasing the defendant's punishment, have not
Iswell[ed] the penalty above what the law has provided for the acts charged.'") (quoting 1
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 192, at 54).
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On the other hand, certain aspects of Apprendi recommended
upholding mandatory minima. A basic problem with sentencing
above the statutory maximum is that the defendant receives pun-
ishment above what the jury authorized. Thus, a defendant who
wrongly receives a supermaximal punishment is, without more,
entitled to a lesser sentence. Not so with statutory minima. A de-
fendant facing an altered minimum could have received the same
sentence regardless of a raised minimum. For a bank robber
whose statutory sentencing range is five years to life, if the judge
applies a seven-year mandatory minimum for discharging a fire-
arm and imposes a sentence of seven years, that same punish-
ment could have been imposed without the mandatory minimum.
Likewise, for a bank robber who receives twelve years, it is often
irrelevant whether the statutory minimum was five years or
seven. If an appellate court were to reverse a defendant's sen-
tence based on an erroneous mandatory minimum, the trial judge
could impose exactly the same sentence without further action by
the jury. This is not because Apprendi errors concerning manda-
tory minima are harmless,218 and the argument does not depend
on what the judge would have done absent the raised minimum.
Rather, the fact that the sentence could have been the same illus-
trates that the defendant's punishment was authorized by the
jury's conviction. Thus, there is no Apprendi problem at all.
Harris upheld mandatory minima and noted that, "Isiince sen-
tencing ranges came into use, defendants have not been able to
predict from the face of the indictment precisely what their sen-
tence will be; the charged facts have simply made them aware of
the 'heaviest punishment' they face if convicted." '219 In dissent,
Justice Thomas (joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg) elabo-
rated arguments from his Apprendi concurrence. Without ques-
tioning "judicial discretion to impose 'judgment within the range
218. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) ("Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity, or
variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.").
219. Harris, 536 U.S. at 562 (plurality opinion) (quoting 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 192, at 54).
Apprendi said that any fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the
maximum authorized by the jury's verdict would have been considered an
element of an aggravated crime... by those who framed the Bill of Rights.
The same cannot be said of a fact increasing the mandatory minimum.., for
the jury's verdict has authorized the judge to impose [that sentence] with or
without the [additional] finding.
Id. at 557 (plurality opinion).
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prescribed by statute,"' Justice Thomas insisted that criminals
have a "constitutional right to know ... those circumstances that
will determine the applicable range of punishment and to have
those circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt."2 " Justice
Thomas acknowledged that defendants theoretically could receive
the same punishment regardless of a changed minimum,221 yet he
proclaimed that "[wihether one raises the floor or raises the ceil-
ing it is impossible to dispute that the defendant is exposed to
greater punishment than is otherwise prescribed," because any
change in the minimum sentence necessarily "constitut[es] an in-
creased penalty. 222
From a practical viewpoint, Justice Thomas's argument is il-
logical. To raise the floor of a defendant's minimum sentence does
not necessarily cause greater punishment, because the defen-
dant's sentence might have been equal to or greater than the ele-
vated minimum in any event.223 The common-sense intuition that
a defendant is made worse off by an increased minimum as-
sumes-and is valid proportionate to-a probability that the de-
fendant would otherwise receive a sentence below that increased
minimum. For example, if a defendant's sentence were deter-
mined by a random number generator, an increased minimum
sentence would increase the average expected sentence. But indi-
viduals' sentences are not numerically random. Some defendants
may have a realistic chance of receiving a minimal or
near-minimal sentence, depending on, inter alia, prosecutorial se-
lectivity, conviction rates, criminal statates, and the method of
calculating punishment. Other defendants with extremely serious
220. Harris, 536 U.S. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
481) (second emphasis added).
221. Id. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 579-80 (Thomas J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also alluded briefly (as he
did in Apprendi itself) to a substantive vision of Apprendi, objecting that, "under the deci-
sion today,.., key facts actually responsible for fixing a defendant's punishment need not
be charged in an indictment or proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (emphasis added).
"[Tihe defendant [under Harris] cannot predict the judgment from the face of the felony."
Id. at 578-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Such objections are by their terms inconsistent
with discretionary sentencing, however, which has exactly those results. See supra notes
86-95 and accompanying text.
223. That is perhaps why Justice Thomas provides empirical analysis of actual sen-
tences imposed under the federal statute at issue in Harris. 536 U.S. at 578 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Despite that contingent factual analysis, it seems clear that Justice Thomas's
primary reasoning rests on principles that are independent of the distribution of sentences
in actual practice. Cf. id. at 579 ("[Olur fundamental constitutional principles cannot alter
depending on degrees of sentencing severity.").
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offenses have no realistic chance of a near-minimum sentence. It
is, thus, wholly case-dependent whether an increased statutory
minimum will make any particular defendant worse off, and if so,
by how much.
22 4
Justice Thomas's analysis becomes more sensible if one sees
that he is focused, not on a defendant's actual punishment, which
the mandatory minimum may not affect, but on the hypothetical
range of available sentences. That theoretical difference takes on
special importance for mandatory minima. In Apprendi and Ring,
the constitutional right at stake was one against unduly harsh
sentences and unjustified deprivations of life or liberty.22 5 That
was not at issue in Harris because the defendant could have re-
ceived the same sentence without the increased minimum.226
Therefore, Justice Thomas was forced to characterize all Ap-
prendi jurisprudence as concerning, not increased sentences, but
effects on the range of sentencing, regardless of whether the in-
crease affected floor or ceiling, and regardless of whether the de-
fendant's actual sentence would change.227 Justice Thomas as-
serted a constitutional parallel between granting judges
discretion to sentence above the statutory maximum and strip-
ping discretion to sentence below the statutory minimum.228 That
parallel would have barred a sentencing judge from imposing any
statutory rule that affects the otherwise applicable range of dis-
cretion available. To be specific, if a bank robber's statutory sen-
tence were five-to-life, and the sentencing judge applied a seven-
year minimum because a firearm was discharged, Justice Tho-
mas's logic would find a constitutional violation (albeit a harm-
less one) even if the judge explicitly indicated that she would
have imposed seven years' imprisonment in any event.
Justice Thomas's interpretation of Apprendi rights had not
been considered in the Court's prior cases, and it was rejected by
224. To repeat for clarity, none of this is to deny that, in the current federal system,
mandatory minima make an enormous difference in the sentences of a substantial number
of defendants, especially including those who occupy the lower end of the applicable statu-
tory sentencing range. Cf Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the ABA Annual Meet-
ing (Aug. 9, 2003) (quoted in 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 126, 127) ("I can accept neither the
necessity nor the wisdom of federal mandatory minimum sentences. In too many cases,
mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and unjust.").
225. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77; Ring, 536 U.S. at 597.
226. Harris, 536 U.S. at 557.
227. See id. at 572-83.
228. See id. at 574.
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the Court's decision in Harris.229 Because the fifth vote, Justice
Scalia, did not write, one must look to Justice Anthony Kennedy's
plurality opinion, which Scalia joined in full.23 ° The plurality's
critical step was to distinguish between the sentence imposed by
the judge and the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict.
"When a judge sentences the defendant to a mandatory mini-
mum, no less than when the judge chooses a sentence within the
[sentencing] range, the grand and petit juries already have found
all the facts necessary to authorize ... the sentence."231 Addi-
tional judicial fact-finding, on whatever standard of proof, is ir-
relevant. "The judge may impose the minimum, the maximum, or
any other sentence within the range without seeking further au-
thorization from those juries-and without contradicting Ap-
prendi."232 The plurality quoted Justice Scalia's Apprendi concur-
rence:
[B]ecause... the judge's choice of sentences within the authorized
range may be influenced by facts not considered by the jury, a fac-
tual finding's practical effect cannot by itself control the constitu-
tional analysis. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments ensure that the de-
fendant "will never get more punishment than he bargained for when
he did the crime," but they do not promise that he will receive "any-
thing less" than that.
233
229. The result in Harris also contradicts the substantive model of Apprendi rights. See
discussion supra Part III.A.
230. The plurality's opinion on these points did not draw five votes because Justice
Breyer refused to agree that Apprendi and Harris could be reconciled. Harris, 536 U.S. at
569-572 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Because Justice
Breyer's vote to uphold the Guidelines is beyond doubt, his disagreement with the plural-
ity's reasoning is not material for present purposes, and it does not affect the operative
authority of Harris's analysis.
Professor Bibas plausibly speculates that Justice Scalia may have decided to vote to up-
hold mandatory minima only after conference. See Bibas, supra note 33, at 81. If true, that
suggestion cuts two ways. On one hand, Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion may have
proved more persuasive to Justice Scalia than he expected. On the other hand, as a late-
comer to the majority's point of view, Justice Scalia may not have scrutinized every detail
of the opinion as carefully as he might have. In any event, just as Justice Scalia's vote in
Harris rejected certain language from Apprendi, his vote in Blakely rejected certain lan-
guage from Harris.
231. Harris, 536 U.S. at 565 (plurality opinion).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 566 (plurality opinion) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., con-
curring)).
The judge may select any sentence within the range, based on facts not al-
leged in the indictment or proved to the jury-even if those facts are specified
by the legislature, and even if they persuade the judge to choose a much
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"Within the range authorized by the jury's verdict... the political
system may channel judicial discretion... by requiring defen-
dants to serve minimum terms after judges make certain factual
findings."234
Under Justice Thomas's Harris analysis, the Guidelines would
obviously be unconstitutional. Although the Guidelines are rules
of the Sentencing Commission, not Congress, they certainly limit
sentencing judges' discretion," 5 and when most commentators say
that there is no difference between the Guidelines and statutory
sentencing rules, that is what they seem to mean.236 Their point
has some appeal. As the state of Washington argued in Blakely,
judges often had more discretion under the State's statutory sys-
tem than the Guidelines would provide in similar circum-
stances.237  In Harris, however, where the judicial-discretion
model would have had a clear impact, Justice Thomas found no
fifth vote. Whether owing to theoretical problems or to difficult
line-drawing,2 31 that failure suggests that the judicial-discretion
model may not present a workable model for Apprendi rights, and
higher sentence than he or she otherwise would have imposed. That a fact af-
fects the defendant's sentence, even dramatically so, does not by itself make
it an element.
Id.
234. Id. at 567 (plurality opinion).
235. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 54 (1993) (describing the Guidelines as
akin to "legislative rules adopted by federal agencies"); accord Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523
n.l (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the Guidelines as "hav[ing] the force and effect of
laws") (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing)); United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 160 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 4.
237. Respondent's Brief, supra note 96, at 24-26, 34; cf. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("If anything, the structural differences that do exist make the
Federal Guidelines more vulnerable to attack [than Washington's scheme].").
The Court flatly rejects respondent's argument that such soft constraints,
which still allow Washington judges to exercise a substantial amount of dis-
cretion, survive Apprendi. This suggests that the hard constraints found
throughout chapters 2 and 3 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which re-
quire an increase in the sentencing range upon specified factual findings, will
meet the same fate. Indeed, the "extraordinary sentence" provision struck
down today is as inoffensive to the holding of Apprendi as a regime of guided
discretion could possibly be. The list of facts that justify an increase in the
range is nonexhaustive. The State's "real facts" doctrine precludes reliance by
sentencing courts upon facts that would constitute the elements of a different
or aggravated offense. If the Washington scheme does not comport with the
Constitution, it is hard to imagine a guidelines scheme that would.
Id. at 2550 (citations omitted).
238. See supra notes 158-96 and accompanying text.
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no commentator has yet offered a satisfactory theoretical defense
of Justice Thomas's approach.
C. A Model of Jury Authorization
There is a third interpretation of Apprendi that would uphold
the Guidelines and require heightened procedures only where a
defendant's sentence exceeds what the jury's verdict authorized.
Under this "jury-authorization" approach, if a sentence, however
calculated, lies within what the jury authorized, there is no Ap-
prendi violation. The Court has repeatedly invoked the concept of
jury authorization as critical to the Apprendi inquiry,239 but nei-
ther the Court nor any commentator has explained what such au-
thorization means or how to determine its scope.24° To discern
what a jury authorized is the only solution to the baseline prob-
lem that underlies all Apprendi jurisprudence.241
In my view, the crime of conviction's statutory maximum
marks the maximum sentence that is authorized by the jury's
verdict. That conclusion finds nominal support in the Court's re-
239. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 (explaining that Apprendi problems arise when
"the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence"); Ring, 536 U.S. at 605 ("[F]acts
increasing punishment beyond the maximum authorized by a guilty verdict standing
alone... must be found by a jury."); id. at 611-12 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the con-
stitutional problem of "state and federal legislatures [that] adopt 'sentencing factors'...
that increase punishment beyond what is authorized by the jury's verdict"); id. at 613
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that "the finding of an aggravating circumstance ex-
pos[ing] 'the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's ver-
dict'... Apprendi makes clear.... cannot be reserved for the judge.").
[Any fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum author-
ized by the jury's verdict would have been considered an element of an aggra-
vated crime-and thus the domain of the jury-by those who framed the Bill
of Rights. The same cannot be said of a fact increasing the mandatory mini-
mum.., for the jury's verdict has authorized the judge to impose the mini-
mum with or without the finding.
Harris, 536 U.S. at 557 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 564-67 (discussing Apprendi's
rule regarding findings to convict a crime versus findings to increase a sentence); Ap-
prendi, 530 U.S. at 491 n.16 ("If facts found by a jury support a guilty verdict of murder,
the judge is authorized by that jury verdict to sentence the defendant to the maximum
sentence provided by the murder statute."); id. at 494 n.19 ("[Tihe relevant inquiry is...
does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that author-
ized by the jury's guilty verdict?").
240. Some scholars have sought to discard discussions of what punishment the jury's
verdict authorizes. See Bibas, supra note 31, at 1134 n.249, 1182-83. Such works, how-
ever, may be best understood as making policy arguments based on the jury's ignorance of
their decisions' practical consequences.
241. See supra notes 208-13.
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peated reference to statutory maxima and the maximum pre-
scribed by the legislature,242 but again, the Court has never ex-
plained why it matters that the maximum punishment for crimi-
nal conduct should be legislative in nature, rather than judicial or
executive. This section seeks to fill those gaps.
It bears preliminary note that a jury-authorization model
would avoid several problems that bother substantive and judi-
cial-discretion theories of Apprendi rights. For example, focusing
on statutory maxima explains why discretionary sentencing is
permissible: All judicial findings in a discretionary sentencing
system, by definition, operate beneath the maximum prescribed
by statute.243 Likewise, a jury-authorization theory avoids any
need to probe deep meanings of judicial discretion or to explain
why Apprendi rights turn on such discretion." Under the jury-
authorization approach, the relatively simple inquiry is whether
242. See, e.g., Blakely, 120 S. Ct. at 2536 ("'Other than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (quoting Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490) (emphasis added); id. at 2537 (defining statutory maximum for Apprendi
purposes); Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 (noting that defendants "are entitled to a jury determina-
tion of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punish-
ment") (emphasis added); id. at 605 ("[I]f the legislature defines some core crime and then
provides for increasing the punishment of that crime upon a finding of some aggravating
fact[,] ... the core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated
crime... .") (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring)) (alterations in
original) (emphasis added); Harris, 536 U.S. at 549 ("Legislatures define crimes in terms
of the facts that are their essential elements, and constitutional guarantees attach to
these facts."); id. ("After the accused is convicted, the judge may impose a sentence within
a range provided by statute, basing it on various facts relating to the defendant and the
manner in which the offense was committed.") (emphasis added); id. at 563 (noting that
Apprendi limited McMillan's holding "'to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sen-
tence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's
verdict'") (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13); id. at 565 ("[T]he facts guiding judicial
discretion below the statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted
to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (disclaiming
any view "that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion ... in imposing a judg-
ment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in this coun-
try have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory lim-
its in the individual case"); id. at 494 n.19 ("[Wihen the term 'sentence enhancement' is
used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's
guilty verdict.") (emphasis added); id. at 495 ("The degree of criminal culpability the legis-
lature chooses to associate with particular, factually distinct conduct has significant impli-
cations both for a defendant's very liberty, and for the heightened stigma associated with
an offense the legislature has selected as worthy of greater punishment.").
243. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text (describing the concepts and prac-
tices of discretionary sentencing).
244. See supra notes 194-214 and accompanying text.
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a statute has attached a maximum sentence to a criminal act. If
so, then to increase a defendant's sentence beyond that maxi-
mum-as a matter of either rule or discretion-violates the de-
fendant's right to indictment and jury trial beyond reasonable
doubt.
1. Exposition
The first step is to recognize that only statutes can create or al-
ter federal crimes. The analytical structure of Apprendi depends
on the presence of two crimes, not just one, and the two-step
analysis at Apprendi's core indicates that, when the legislature
defines a crime, that statutory definition is constitutionally im-
portant.24 Legislative definitions of crimes are what link maxi-
mum sentences with criminal conduct, and such maxima cannot
be supplemented thereafter by judicial sentence enhancements.246
To impose a super-maximal sentence effectively defines a new
crime, and constitutional protections appertain to each of that
new crime's elements.
The importance of statutory definitions under federal law is
clear even from Apprendi's precursor, Jones v. United States.247 In
Jones, the Court construed a carjacking statute as having created
multiple aggravated offenses, which required indictment and jury
trial of their aggravating facts.248 In the Court's view, Congress
effectively crafted separate crimes by imposing different statutory
maximum sentences for different criminal conduct.249 Impor-
tantly, all members of the Court agreed that indictment and jury
trial were necessary if and only if Congress had created two
crimes; the only controversy was whether Congress had done so.
When Apprendi elevated Jones from statutory construction to
constitutional law, the Court required jury trial of all facts that
increase punishment above the crime of conviction's statutory
maximum. Apprendi held that the New Jersey legislature's two
statutory maxima created two crimes, and that defendants could
not be convicted of the lesser offense but sentenced for the greater
245. See supra notes 71-95 and accompanying text.
246. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490-497.
247. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
248. Id. at 251-52.
249. Id.
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one. 250 After Apprendi, any statute with the effect of defining a
crime has constitutional significance, regardless of its name, and
regardless of whether another legal provision purports to set a
greater "true maximum sentence."251
Because the Guidelines are not statutes,252 they cannot define
or redefine federal crimes.253 Congress has unique authority to de-
fine federal crimes by statute, and federal courts can neither pro-
scribe criminal conduct nor change the terms of a crime that Con-
gress has defined.2 4 The executive branch, likewise, lacks such
power, and constitutional problems persist regardless of whether
courts or administrators act through quasi-legislative rules or
case-by-case discretion.255 Congressional statutes stand alone in
defining criminal conduct even though, from many perspectives,
nonstatutory crimes could be issued with broad notice and could
be applied to defendants just like statutory crimes.25 6
As for the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission is an inde-
pendent agent within the judicial branch, 257 and Congress did not
250. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
251. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
252. Cf. supra note 116 (discussing PROTECT Act).
253. See GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 5Gl.1(a); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2000) (requiring all
Guidelines to be consistent with statutory provisions of the United States Criminal Code).
254. Cf United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001)
("[U]nder our constitutional system.., federal crimes are defined by statute rather than
by common law.").
[I]t would not follow that the Courts of [the federal] Government are vested
with jurisdiction over any particular act done by an individual in supposed
violation of the peace and dignity of the sovereign power. The legislative au-
thority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it,
and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S.(1 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
255. See supra notes 191-238 and accompanying text.
256. The reservation of legislative power to define crimes and set maximum punish-
ments is by no means the only instance of separated powers in criminal law. Judges can-
not prosecute defendants, and legislatures cannot condemn them, even though certain
functional aspects of those prosecutions and judgments might be acceptable if performed
by entities within the proper branch-judicial. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (observing that "Congress' decision to create an independent rule-
making body to promulgate sentencing Guidelines and to locate that body within the Judi-
cial Branch is not unconstitutional unless Congress has vested in the Commission powers
that are more appropriately performed by the other Branches or that undermine the in-
tegrity of the Judiciary"). All of this demonstrates only that criminal law, including sen-
tencing, is an area where the formal lines of constitutional authority may be sharply
drawn and strictly applied.
257. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2000) (establishing "an independent commission in the judicial
branch of the United States").
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empower the Commission to alter statutory definitions of
258crimes. Indeed, there is some doubt whether Congress could
constitutionally have done so, any more than it could have as-
signed the power to define crimes to the Department of Justice or
the General Accounting Office. 259 For example, unlike the statu-
tory definitions of greater and lesser crimes in Apprendi, Ring,
and Blakely,26 ° the Sentencing Commission lacks structural au-
thority to alter 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) by creating lesser included of-
fenses like bank robbery without evidence of amount.26' The Sen-
tencing Commission also lacks authority to modify the twenty-
year maximum punishment provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), de-
spite the Guidelines' legal limits upon judicial discretion within
that statutory range.262
To me, it makes no sense to describe the Guidelines' base of-
fense level as redefining a defendant's crime of conviction.263 A de-
fendant who pleads guilty only to the statutory terms of bank rob-
bery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is not convicted of any lesser
included Guidelines offense. Thus, to increase a defendant's sen-
tence above the Guidelines' base offense level does not exceed the
maximum for the crime of conviction. Everything that occurs un-
der the Guidelines, including all judicial fact-finding, is intended
to, and does in fact, operate beneath the congressionally pre-
scribed maximum punishment for the crime of conviction.2 4
258. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2000) (requiring all Guidelines to be consistent with statutory
provisions of the United States Criminal Code).
259. But cf. Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power
Within the Executive Branch, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1998) (proposing, without
explicitly discussing separation of powers principles, that the Department of Justice
should be granted regulatory law-making power akin to administrative agencies).
260. See supra notes 35, 71-72, 86-94 and accompanying text.
261. See generally supra notes 24-30 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and GUIDELINES,
supra note 20, § 2B3.1).
262. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000) (requiring courts to impose a sentence within
a range set by the Guidelines and Congress); Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515
(1998) (requiring only that the ultimate guideline sentence lies within the statutory limits
relevant to the crime of conviction); accord Harris, 536 U.S. at 560 (plurality opinion); Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
263. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
264. See GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 5Gl.1(a)-(c) (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)
(2000) (requiring all Guidelines to be consistent with statutory provisions of the United
States Criminal Code). The one exception to the text's description is discussed supra note
117.
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Before Blakely, the courts of appeals had all adopted the above
analysis in rejecting Apprendi challenges to the Guidelines.265
Under the conventional narrative, Congress chose high maximum
sentences for some crimes, which in turn produced broad sentenc-
ing ranges.266 Then Congress asked the judicial branch, through
the newborn Sentencing Commission, to restrict individual
judges' discretion to choose sentences within those statutory sen-
tencing ranges."' The judiciary's nonstatutory involvement in
sentencing policy, however, was never thought to alter the under-
lying statutory crimes for which sentences were imposed.268
The pre-Blakely narrative retains force. It is constitutionally
permissible for an individual judge to make case-by-case factual
findings at sentencing (provided they do not result in a super-
maximal sentence), a judge could use her own set of sentencing
rules, and several or all judges could use the same rules.26 9 What
265. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
266. For example, a sentence for robbery, depending on the circumstances of the com-
mission of that crime, can carry a punishment ranging from thirty-three months to life
imprisonment. See GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 2B3.1 (2004); id. ch. 5, pt. A (2004).
267. Judges must increase the offense level for the crime of robbery if certain aggravat-
ing factors, such as bodily injury, are present. Id. § 2B3.1(3)(A)-(E) (2004).
268. In Mistretta v. United States, the Court upheld the Sentencing Commission
against separation of powers objections. 488 U.S. 361, 380-412 (1989). Justice Scalia dis-
sented on the ground that the Sentencing Commission impermissibly "exercise[d] no gov-
ernmental power other than the making of laws." Id. at 413-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Presumably, Scalia's objection would have been even stronger had he also believed that
the Commission was making laws that were, in effect, redefining crimes.
269. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text. Perhaps certain judicial-
discretion theorists would object if sentencing rules were enforced by appellate courts in-
stead of trial courts on their own. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text (describ-
ing such circumstances as Option (5)). As discussed above, however, the constitutionality
of judicial sentencing rules should not turn on such details for Fifth and Sixth Amendment
purposes. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
Incidentally, Justice Scalia's separation of powers objection might also apply to rules is-
sued by courts of appeals because they might, in his view, arrogate the legislative power to
make the laws. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413. Justice Scalia's separation of powers objection
has no legal connection to constitutional claims under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Some court-watchers, however, might suggest that Justice Scalia's Mistretta dissent re-
vealed that he would relish any chance to overturn the Guidelines, regardless of the tech-
nical ground asserted. See, e.g., King & Klein, supra note 4, at 316-17 & n.17 (noting that
Justice Scalia is 'on record that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional").
That, of course, is possible, but, without undue digressions into guesswork, three con-
trary thoughts bear mention. First, in opinions after Mistretta, Justice Scalia has ap-
peared ready to apply the Guidelines on their own terms, without regard for his view con-
cerning their constitutionality. See, e.g., Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001)
(affirming a district court's application of the Guidelines' career offender provision,
GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 4Bl.1 (2004)); Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 514
(1998) (affirming a district court's application of the Guidelines' crack provision in evaluat-
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is important is not whether the Sentencing Commission's Guide-
lines resemble edicts of a "super-judge."270 Unlike a super-judge,
the Commission obviously does not decide individual cases. Nev-
ertheless, the Commission lies within the judiciary and, like
every entity other than Congress, lacks authority to alter the
statutory rules that define crimes and set maximum punish-
ments.271
The unique significance of statutory sentencing rules derives
not only from Apprendi's terms and separation of powers juris-
prudence, it also concerns the fundamental nature of jury rights.
The jury must convict a defendant for any sentence to be im-
posed,272 and a jury's conviction for one crime does not authorize
punishment beyond the maximum authorized for the crime of
conviction.273 The statutory maximum for the crime of conviction
thus sets the harshest punishment allowed by the jury's ver-
dict.274
ing relevant conduct that the jury's verdict did not directly support); Lewis v. United
States, 523 U.S. 155, 180 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing explic-
itly with the majority's decision to remand the case for sentencing under the Guidelines).
Second, Justice Scalia's dilemma in Booker may be similar to that in Ring, where the
Court interpreted Arizona's rules concerning aggravating factors. 536 U.S. at 609. Justice
Scalia noted that many States had adopted such procedural mechanisms in response to
the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence. In Justice Scalia's view, that jurispru-
dence "had no proper foundation in the Constitution," and he expressed reluctance to
"magnify [such] burdens.., on the States" by requiring that aggravating factors be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J. concurring). Scalia's opinion in Ring none-
theless followed his views of Apprendi, not his collateral views regarding the context to
which it was applied. It is more than possible that, whichever way Scalia votes in Booker,
that decision will represent his newly minted view of Apprendi rights, not a reheated reci-
tation of his dissent in Mistretta.
Third, Scalia's analysis under Mistretta would imply invalidating the Guidelines as a
whole, and it is unclear whether the Harris dissenters would accept that result.
270. Booker, 375 F.3d at 512.
271. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 395 (holding that "in placing the Commission in
the Judicial Branch, Congress... does nothing to upset the balance of power among the
Branches").
272. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 31, at 1182 ("There is no sense in which a jury verdict
authorizes any particular level of punishment. The verdict simply writes a blank check for
legislators and judges to fill in.").
273. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
274. Although judges seldom, if ever, allow juries to know their verdict's sentencing
consequences, see, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1994) (declining
to allow juries to learn about range of possible punishments); Bibas, supra note 31, at 1134
n.249, 1182-83; King & Klein, supra note 31, at 1508-13; Sherry F. Colb, A Significant
Decision That May Not Matter: The Supreme Court Holds That Only Juries, Not Judges,
Can Make The Factual Determinations That Increase Sentences, at http://writ.findlaw.com/
colb/20040629.html (June 29, 2004) (last visited Apr. 2, 2005), that does not change the
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From that viewpoint, Apprendi reveals a simple but important
relationship among the jury's verdict, the statutory maximum,
and the sentence imposed. The crime of conviction is the link be-
tween culpable conduct and a maximum sentence-without that
statutory provision, there could be no federal crime at all.275 The
jury applies the crime of conviction's statutory definition in find-
ing a defendant guilty-without that verdict, no guilt could be es-
tablished and no punishment imposed. Yet the jury's verdict con-
sists of and depends upon the crime of conviction's statutory
definition-in every detail, that statute is the predicate for the
jury's conviction, and it articulates that verdict's maximum con-
sequence.2" 6 In the moment that a jury votes to convict, the ver-
dict and the statutory definition merge, and the two together are
what limit the punishment that may thereafter be imposed.
The jury-authorization model's distinctive feature is its link to
the jury verdict's constitutional meaning. The right to trial by
jury bars any other agent from convicting a defendant,277 but a
jury's guilty verdict also authorizes other governmental agents to
determine and impose punishment.7 The question "how much
punishment?" is the profound issue that Apprendi's progeny must
address. Under the jury-authorization model, the Constitution is
satisfied if the sentence imposed lies below the statutory maxi-
mum, and it makes no difference how judicial discretion is used
(or limited) in imposing a submaximal sentence. 9 For purposes
of jury rights, the Guidelines are like mandatory minima: After
the jury convicted under the relevant statute, the defendant could
systematic function of a jury's verdict as a prerequisite to imposing legally permissible
punishment. It simply means that, for contestable policy reasons, the jurors may exercise
their constitutional function without full knowledge of their verdict's practical conse-
quences.
275. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946) (noting that criminal
defendants "must be tried by an impartial jury").
278. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(a), 3553(a)(2) (2000) (requiring courts, not a jury, to
sentence a criminal defendant after conviction).
279. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
[Niothing ... suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discre-
tion-taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and of-
fender-in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We
have often noted that judges in this country have long exercised discretion of
this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the individual
case.
See, e.g., id.
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have received the exact same sentence regardless of applicable
nonstatutory sentencing rules.28 °
Any sentence consistent with the statutory crime of conviction
is, by that fact, authorized by a jury's conviction for that statutory
crime, and that is why Apprendi should not apply to the Guide-
lines. To be clear, this is not a question of legislative intent or la-
bels. As Apprendi instructed, "the relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect-does the required finding expose the defen-
dant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's
guilty verdict.""' Thus, if the Commission had effective power to
"expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that author-
ized by the jury's guilty verdict," i.e., by the statutory crime of
conviction, such actions would be unconstitutional.2"2 The Com-
mission, however, lacks such power in form and effect. The
Guidelines do not alter the crime of conviction prescribed by Con-
gress, they do not change the statutory requirements for a guilty
verdict thereunder, and they do not change the maximum pun-
ishment authorized by the statute and the jury's verdict.2"'
Incidental to its theoretical merits, the jury-authorization
model finds indirect support in two aspects of the Supreme
Court's Blakely opinion. First, Justice Scalia's majority opinion
conflicts, at least in part, with the judicial-discretion approach.
Washington defended its statutory scheme by arguing that, be-
cause the trial judge retained discretion to depart from Blakely's
fifty-three-month standard sentencing range even on grounds un-
enumerated in any statute, it was not a true statutory maxi-
mum.28 4 Although Washington's statutory scheme did retain some
level of judicial discretion, that discretion did not change the re-
sult. In reply to dissents, Justice Scalia correctly explained that
the Sixth Amendment "is not a limitation on judicial power, but a
reservation of jury power. It limits judicial power only to the ex-
tent that the claimed judicial power infringes on the province of
the jury."28 5 Likewise, the Sixth Amendment is not a guarantee of
judicial power, and it is constitutionally irrelevant that nonstatu-
tory Guidelines, by restricting judicial discretion, may result in a
280. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
281. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added).
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 253-69 and accompanying text.
284. Respondent's Brief, supra note 96, at 10-14.
285. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540.
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base offense level that is lower than the maximum authorized by
the statute.
To restrict judicial discretion is, without more, neither a consti-
tutional virtue nor a vice. Nonstatutory constraints on judicial
discretion do not change a crime's statutory definition or maxi-
mum. Such limits also do not alter the maximum sentence au-
thorized by a jury's verdict. Once attention is focused exclusively
upon defining the province of the jury, it becomes clear that the
jury's role is to authorize, by guilty verdict, criminal punishment
not greater than the crime of conviction's statutory maximum.
In Apprendi, Justice Scalia wrote that, after a valid conviction,
the Constitution allows defendants to receive far less than the
statutory maximum through the "mercy of a tenderhearted
judge," early release due to a "tenderhearted parole commission,"
or a commutation by a "tenderhearted governor."" 6 Although the
Guidelines are seldom accused of being tenderhearted, the princi-
ple is the same. Under the Guidelines, "the criminal will never
get more punishment than he bargained for when he did the
crime. " "' Put more precisely, no defendant will receive a greater
punishment than what the defining statute authorizes upon a
jury's conviction.
Second, the Court has repeatedly affirmed modern legislatures'
ability to limit and structure the discretion of sentencing
judges,2"' and the Blakely Court similarly disclaimed "find[ing]
determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional."2 9 Instead, the
Court purported to address how determinate sentencing systems
"can be implemented in a way that respects the Sixth Amend-
ment."29° That suggestion would seem illusory, and perhaps dis-
286. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
287. Id.
288. Harris, 536 U.S. at 558 (plurality opinion).
In the latter part of the 20th century, many legislatures, dissatisfied with
sentencing disparities among like offenders, implemented measures regulat-
ing judicial discretion. These systems maintained the statutory ranges and
the judge's fact-finding role but assigned a uniform weight to factors judges
often relied upon when choosing a sentence.
Id.
289. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540 (alteration in original) (quoting Respondent's Brief, su-
pra note 96, at 34).
290. Id. Any tension is superficial as between this attention to form and manner and
Apprendi's statement that "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect." Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 494. The latter inquiry was whether the "required finding expose[s] the defen-
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ingenuous, if determinate sentencing cannot be implemented
without placing in the indictment all facts that cause a greater
sentence than the defendant's base offense level and proving
them to a jury beyond reasonable doubt. The cornerstone of de-
terminate sentencing regimes is a judge's rule-bound responsibil-
ity for making postconviction findings and prescribing an appro-
priate sentence.291 Such systems could hardly function if every
postconviction finding that increased a sentence above nonstatu-
tory base offense levels had to appear in the indictment and be
proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt. What would a judge
determine at sentencing, the ministerial results of the jury's find-
ings, or findings that only reduce a defendant's sentence? Either
result would seem extraordinary in light of Justice Scalia's asser-
tion that he did not find determinate sentencing schemes uncon-
stitutional.292 By contrast, a jury-authorization theory yields a
simple and elegant rule for identifying which determinate sen-
tencing schemes are unconstitutional. Invalid systems are ones
that effectively prescribe one statutory maximum, attached to
lesser crime, yet allow imposition of a greater sentence under
what is in effect the statutory definition of a second, greater
crime. Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely all involved such unconstitu-
tional schemes, but the Guidelines do not.
dant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict." Id. The
question of what the jury's verdict authorizes is necessarily formal, at least in part. See
supra notes 194-208 and accompanying text.
291. But cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b) (Supp. 2003) (reacting to state Supreme
Court decision by providing that "any fact that would increase the penalty for a crime be-
yond the statutory maximum.., shall be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reason-
able doubt"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b)(3) (Supp. 2003) (allowing the court "in the in-
terests of justice" to reserve questions regarding such facts for determination at post-
conviction sentencing proceedings); King & Klein, supra note 4, at 319 (discussing Kan-
sas's solution to its Apprendi problems). Of course, Kansas is not bound by the federal in-
dictment requirement, which has not been incorporated against the States. See Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). Also Professor Bibas has argued that the process of
indictment itself can significantly alter the practical dynamics of criminal sentencing. See
Bibas, supra note 31, at 1142-43. More importantly, the current meaning of determinate
sentencing is that judicial rules are applied to allocate a sentence from the applicable
range for criminals convicted of the same crime. To attempt the Kansas approach on a fed-
eral scale would treat each base offense level under the Guidelines as a separate crime,
with a small discretionary range of sentences remaining for judicial decision. Whether
that system is good or bad as a policy matter, it bears only a modest resemblance to cur-
rent understanding of determinate sentencing.
292. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540 (quoting Respondent's Brief, supra note 96, at 34).
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2. Objections
Opposition to a jury-authorization model derives from its ar-
guably formalist preoccupation with statutes. The critique's
sharpest form, advanced by Judge Posner, claims that applying
Apprendi to congressional statutes, but not Guidelines, would ab-
surdly imply that "an administrative agency is to be deemed a
more responsible, a more authoritative, fount of criminal law
than a legislature."93 How can the Commission do by guideline
what Congress cannot by statute?
Judge Posner adopts a flawed premise. 294 The jury-authoriza-
tion model would commend different constitutional analysis for
statutory and nonstatutory judicial rules precisely because of
Congress's unique authority to define crimes and prescribe statu-
tory maxima. One need not suggest that the Commission is more
responsible or authoritative than Congress.295 On the contrary, it
is what the Commission cannot do that creates the constitutional
difference, and that is why the congressionally prescribed maxi-
mum should govern for constitutional purposes. The statute-
based judicial-authorization principle presents an otherwise elu-
sive baseline for determining the maximum punishment that the
jury has authorized, and that is the constitutional standard
against which an impermissibly increased sentence shall be
measured.296
No judicial rule, despite its practical and legal force in limiting
judicial discretion, can create lesser included offenses where Con-
gress has not done so. If a jury convicts a defendant of bank rob-
bery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), with a twenty-year maximum
sentence, that is the crime of conviction, and that is the maxi-
mum sentence. Not more, but also not less. The judicial branch
may create rules that constrain judges' discretion and reduce
some defendants' expected sentence, but such an entity cannot
lower a federal crime's statutory maximum, nor can it redefine
the statutory crime of conviction. 297 Thus, it cannot reduce the
293. Booker, 375 F.3d at 512.
294. See supra notes 191-218 and accompanying text.
295. Booker, 375 F.3d at 512.
296. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
297. With imagination, one might conceive of other institutions whose rule-bound deci-
sions might affect individuals' sentences. For example, a discretionary sentencing regime
could disallow judges from imposing any sentence within the statutory range greater than
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maximum sentence authorized by the jury's guilty verdict. As our
age's most renowned judicial pragmatist, Judge Posner assumes
that what a sentencing rule does should be measured by its effect
on defendants and judicial discretion, but each of those is a prob-
lematic basis for interpreting Apprendi.298
A simple version of Justice Posner's critique might more di-
rectly ask how it can matter whether a particular rule is applied
by statute or by guideline, when the effects on defendants and
judges are the same? In response, the reasons that substantive
effects on defendants and limits on judicial discretion lack weight
under Apprendi bear repetition: From a defendant's perspective,
discretionary sentencing could permissibly impose punishment in
any case (or, with imagination, in every case) identical to the sen-
tence imposed under the Guidelines. On the facts of Apprendi, for
example, New Jersey's legislature could permissibly raise the
statutory maximum for unlawful firearm possession to twenty
years, and state judges could in every case (at the legislature's
suggestion) apply the top half of that range only after themselves
finding that the offense qualified as a hate crime. It seems
equally clear that Harris would allow New Jersey, after raising
the statutory maximum to twenty years, to impose a statutory
minimum of ten years for hate crimes. These hypotheticals illus-
trate that neither defendants' freedom from judicial punishment,
nor judges' freedom from binding rules, is a defining principle for
identifying Apprendi rights.
Both versions of the formalist critique rest on the undefended
assumption that Apprendi rights are defined by practical effects
on defendants' liberty or judges' discretion, but the jury-
authorization model rejects that assumption. 99 Moreover, we
have seen that the judicial-discretion model confronts its own
problems of formalism in defining what count as binding sentenc-
ing rules.30 0 Formalism is not always a fatal flaw in criminal
practice, 30 1 and, if one is to choose among shades of formalism, the
what the prosecutor requests. Under that hypothesis, even if prosecutors were in turn
governed by administrative rules, implemented through extrajudicial fact-finding, etc.,
those executive rules would not alter the statutory maximum, the statutory crime of con-
viction, or the maximum sentence authorized by the jury's verdict.
298. See supra notes 125-91 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Part III.C.
300. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
301. Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 221-25 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting)
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jury-authorization model has the virtue of being rooted in consti-
tutional separation of powers and a direct interpretation of what
guilty verdicts mean.
Indeed, for an overly vigorous critic of the jury-authorization
model, Apprendi itself could be derided as formalist because it
applies differently to regimes with the same effect for defendants
and sentencing judges.2 Apprendi's dissenters have continuously
attacked the Court's jurisprudence as formalistic." 3 Although
such analysis might lead one to reject Apprendi as a whole, 0 4 it
should not lead one to invalidate the Guidelines. For reasons de-
scribed herein, I believe that Apprendi remains constitutionally
important even under the relatively narrow approach prescribed
by the jury-authorization model. For any one who does not share
that view, the task is to defend the substantive or judicial-
discretion models described above, or to construct a new and bet-
ter theoretical approach to Apprendi rights.
From one perspective, to accuse Apprendi of formalism is just
another way to say that the case protects different values. Ap-
prendi does not exist to shelter and protect defendants from judi-
cially determined punishment (the substantive model), nor does it
exist to ensure individual judges' predominance in determining
punishment (the judicial-discretion model). 5 Instead, Apprendi
is a slimmer rule that requires a connection between the legisla-
ture's definition of a crime, a jury's verdict of conviction, and the
maximum that may be imposed for that crime. In Justice Scalia's
terms, Apprendi is not a "mere procedural formality," designed to
benefit criminal defendants, but is "a fundamental reservation of
power in our constitutional structure."0 ' It is a systemic rule that
preserves the jury's importance in authorizing a defendant's
(deriding the Court's jurisprudence concerning affirmative defenses as indefensibly "for-
malistic"); Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 & n.5.
302. But cf. King & Klein, supra note 31, at 1485-88, 1498 (defending a relatively nar-
row view of Apprendi against charges of formalism).
303. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 555-66 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting), cf. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2547 ('[I]t is difficult for me to discern what principle
besides doctrinaire formalism actually motivates today's decision.") (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
304. See Bibas, supra note 31, at 1123-48.
305. Note that, from this perspective, the two competing theories lie in direct tension
with one another, which may be why jurists have not explicitly attempted to synthesize
the two.
306. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
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maximum sentence, but also respects legislative authority to de-
fine the maximum punishment for criminal conduct and to struc-
ture judicially imposed sentences beneath that statutory maxi-
mum.
Apprendi may not yield profound substantive rights for crimi-
nal defendants, but I believe it remains a landmark in constitu-
tional law for at least one important reason. As Justice Scalia's
concurrence explains, had Apprendi been decided otherwise-
allowing a defendant to be convicted of one crime and punished
above that crime's maximum sentence-the right to a jury trial
would be entirely contingent on legislative preference. 3 7 Justice
Scalia dared the dissenters to articulate a different constitutional
view of jury rights:
What ultimately demolishes the case for the dissenters is that they
are unable to say what the right to trial by jury does guarantee if, as
they assert, it does not guarantee-what it has been assumed to
guarantee throughout our history-the right to have a jury deter-
mine those facts that determine the maximum sentence the law al-
lows. They provide no coherent alternative.
30 8
In my view, that challenge stands unmet; thus, until a better the-
ory emerges-or until jury rights are conceded to be a matter for
legislative choice-the jury-authorization model stands as a prin-
cipled explanation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the
Court's recent cases, with roots in constitutional separation of
powers, discretionary sentencing, legislative power to define
crimes and prescribe maximum punishments, and full constitu-
tional respect for a jury's decision to convict.
IV. BOOKER AND PRESSURE-COOKED CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
Amidst significant uproar, the Court in Booker will decide
whether the Federal Guidelines are constitutional. We have al-
ready considered that question's merits, 09 but the process that
307. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring); accord Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999) (recognizing the danger that "an unlimited legislative
power to authorize determinations setting ultimate sentencing limits without a jury would
invite erosion of the jury's function to a point against which a line must necessarily be
drawn").
308. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99.
309. See supra Part III.
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generated the outcry also merits note. The public's reaction is
partly driven by legal issue's magnitude, but it also stems from
the chaos that has followed Blakely. From circuit conflict, to con-
gressional declaration, to expedited Supreme Court argument,
there is a sense that the trip from Blakely to Booker has tested, if
not jumped, the rails of ordinary constitutional adjudication, and
one might doubt whether such circumstances yield an optimal
environment for crafting rules of such social and political impor-
tance.
Conventional wisdom has obscured such questions. For most
commentators, Blakely's merits and its chaos go hand in hand.
Some hail Blakely-inspired disruptions as inevitable growing
pains through which the Guidelines' unconstitutionality will ap-
pear. 1 ° Others revile such events as a natural disaster that has
rumbled since Apprendi and has now emerged in full force.311
From both viewpoints, systemic disarray is the upshot of consti-
tutional principle, so that (aside from an opposite result in
Blakely or Apprendi) the current upheaval could not be helped.
This Article demonstrates that Booker's result is not inevitable,
and the jury-authorization approach suggests that post-Blakely
confusion was anything but natural. Pre-Blakely cases demon-
strate that Apprendi did not require such upheaval,312 and
Blakely said little more than its precursor.313 Thus, whatever ren-
dered the uneven path from Blakely to Booker, it is due-not to
those cases' substantive content-but to institutional actors'
choices along the way.
This Part analyzes forces that contributed to the post-Blakely
crisis. Although the public hue has drawn attention to an impor-
tant constitutional case, it has also required the Court to decide
issues of constitutional law under an unusually compressed
schedule. Regardless of how the Court decides the pending Guide-
line cases, it is apt to examine recent events for broader lessons
about legal institutions' behavior, and this case study in constitu-
tional rule making yields insights for constitutional decision mak-
310. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 4, at 307.
311. See, e.g., Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("What I have
feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sentencing reforms are all but lost,
and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in jeopardy.").
312. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97.
313. See supra Part II.A.
[Vol. 39:11551222
APPRENDrS LIMITS
ing outside the sentencing sphere, revealing how similar juris-
prudential crises might be avoided in the future.
Perhaps the best way to proceed is to analyze two hypotheses,
imagining first that Booker were to adopt the jury-authorization
model and upholds the Guidelines, and then that the Court were
to strike down the Guidelines. Under the first scenario, the
Blakely majority's ambiguity in defining "statutory maximum"
might be criticized for generating such extraordinary and unnec-
essary excitement.314 On the other hand, the Court may have its
excuses. For example, some Justices might have expected a more
muted reaction to Blakely, akin to the courts of appeals' response
to Apprendi's loose language.315 Also, the Court's clarity might
have been muddied by the inability of a five-vote majority to
agree on what should be said about the Guidelines.316 Such fac-
tors may not fully exculpate the Blakely majority, but modern
Supreme Court practice is fraught with ambiguities, especially
when the Court decides a case but leaves important issues unre-
solved.317
Two other institutional actors bear close attention. First, the
Blakely dissenters' strong words and postdecision comments 31
were unconstrained by bureaucratic needs to attract votes. Yet
such rhetoric was the first and perhaps greatest cause of the post-
Blakely fracas. There is of course a wide range of reasonable
views on the proper role of judicial dissents.319 But Blakely's dis-
senters might have been well-served to maintain a more meas-
314. But cf supra notes 77-93 and accompanying text (arguing that the most natural
reading of that passage would not affect the Guidelines).
315. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97.
316. See text accompanying notes 60-61.
317. At least one commentator seems generally to praise the Court when it leaves am-
biguities unresolved under such circumstances. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3-5 (1999). Others take a more
skeptical view. See Neil S. Siegel, A Theory In Search of a Court, and Itself Judicial
Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
318. See, e.g., Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2551
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2561 (Breyer, J., dissenting); O'Connor Disgusted, supra
note 50.
319. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2004); William J.
Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 431-32 (1986); Anita S. Krish-
nakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781 (2000);
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholar-
ship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267 (2001); Richard A.
Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998).
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ured tone in discussing the Guidelines' constitutionality, an issue
of obvious importance and uncertain result. If the Court's highest
dissenting tradition traces to Louis Brandeis, John Marshall
Harlan, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and others, whose strong words
coincided with a principled change in favor of their views,32 ° the
dramatic tones struck in Blakely only gave shelter to the dissent-
ers' enemies, which is why arguments against the Guidelines'
constitutionality cite Blakely's dissents as primary proof.2 ' Per-
haps the Blakely dissenters were trying to persuade a swing voter
to force a decision regarding the Guidelines, draw public atten-
tion, or just vent after another battle's loss. It is clear, however,
that the dissents' unintended consequences have tended to tip the
balance against their legal position, and Justice O'Connor's char-
acterization of the Court's decision making as "disgust[ing]"322
only worsened that effect. Whatever one's views regarding the op-
timal pitch of filed dissents, it is rare for Justices so vigorously to
criticize their colleagues in public speeches, and that is almost
certainly good for the Court as an institution.323
A second factor that spurred post-Blakely disarray was the
quick and bold reactions of certain courts of appeals. Blakely was
decided on June 24, 2004.324 The timeline of subsequent events is
telling and easily overlooked. On July 9, 2004, only ten business
days after Blakely and three days after argument, Judge Posner
issued an opinion for the Seventh Circuit finding the Guidelines
unconstitutional.3 2' On July 14, Judge Merritt did likewise for the
Sixth Circuit,2 6 followed by Judge Paez for the Ninth Circuit on
320. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
321. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
322. O'Connor Disgusted, supra note 50.
323. An extraordinary example that proves the point is Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2001). Academics have issued largely negative characterizations of the Court's work in
this case. See, e.g., A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Ronald Dworkin, ed. 2002); BUSH v. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman, ed. 2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING
THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); THE
VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein,
eds. 2002). But the controversies surely would have raged higher if the dissenting Justices
themselves had openly criticized the decision in circuit conferences or other public fora.
324. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2531.
325. Booker, 375 F.3d at 508.
326. United States v. Montgomery, No. 03-5256 (6th Cir. July 14, 2004), vacated for
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July 21,327 and by Judges Lay and Bright for the Eighth Circuit
on July 23.328 On July 12, the Second Circuit certified the Guide-
lines' constitutionality to the Supreme Court and requested that
the Supreme Court hold expedited briefing and argument during
its summer recess.329
On July 21, at the highwater mark of opposition to the Guide-
lines (with the aforementioned five circuits refusing to apply
them), the Acting Solicitor General sought expedited Supreme
Court review, which the Court granted in part.33° The pressure for
a quick decision abated somewhat when three of the five circuits
reversed course,331 and some courts pursued alternate sentencing
(assigning sentences both with and without the Guidelines' in-
struction) in order to ease any transition if the Guidelines were
struck down.332 By that time, however, the Supreme Court's hur-
ried briefing and argument schedule was already set.
Aside from the merits of the post-Blakely appellate decisions,333
their most remarkable characteristic is speed. Those who have
studied or practiced in the federal system know that such fast de-
cisions from any circuit would be noteworthy-such swiftness
from five circuits is almost unheard of. Acknowledging departure
from normal procedure, Judge Posner explained his Court's need
for speed as follows: "We have expedited our decision in an effort
to provide some guidance to the district judges (and our own
court's staff), who are faced with an avalanche of motions for re-
sentencing in the light of [Blakely] .
reh'g en banc, 2004 WL 1562904 (6th Cir. July 19, 2004), dismissed, 2004 WL 1637660
(6th Cir. July 23, 2004).
327. United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004).
328. United States v. Mooney, No. 02-3388 (8th Cir. July 23, 2004), vacated for reh'g en
banc, 2004 WL 1636960 (Aug. 6, 2004).
329. United States v. Peneranda, 375 F.3d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 2004); cf. United States v.
Mincey, 380 F.3d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (upholding the Guidelines pending
the Supreme Court's decision in Booker).
330. See Supreme Court Docket, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-105.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
331. United States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding the
Guidelines' constitutionality); Mincey, 380 F.3d 102 (per curiam); Mooney, 2004 WL
1636960. The Ninth Circuit also has a pending petition for en banc and panel rehearing in
Ameline.
332. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (en banc); Hammoud, 378 F.3d at 426 (en banc).
333. See supra notes 324-34 and accompanying text.
334. Booker, 375 F.3d at 510.
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One may easily admire the diligence of Judge Posner and of his
dissenting colleague, Judge Easterbrook. But Judge Posner's ex-
planation has two weaknesses. First is historical context. After
Apprendi, defendants in every court of appeals, including the
Seventh Circuit, filed challenges to the Guidelines' constitutional-
ity. Every court of appeals rejected those claims,335 and no court of
appeals sought to hear argument and decide the issue within two
weeks. Why should there be an unexpected rush now to embrace
a legal theory that the appellate courts, and the Supreme Court's
certiorari practice, had unanimously ignored for five years since
Apprendi issued? If anything, a quick decision is less necessary
now than when Apprendi was decided, because the Supreme
Court has held that Apprendi rights can be forfeited and are not
retroactive, 36 thereby limiting the number of defendants with
valid constitutional claims and mitigating the risk of any ava-
lanche of pending cases before the courts of appeals.
Second, despite its opinion's rhetoric, the Seventh Circuit did
not in fact provide adequate "guidance to the district judges...
who are faced with ... motions for resentencing in the light of
[Blakely] ."3' Although the opinion explained that the Guidelines
were unconstitutional, it did not guide district courts on what to
do next-whether to apply the Guidelines as hortatory, apply the
Guidelines where they do not enhance sentences, resort to discre-
tionary sentencing, or pursue some other option. Judge Posner
suggested that his court could "hardly attempt to resolve such is-
sues on this appeal; the parties have not briefed or argued
them."33' But that only explains why any guidance to district
courts in Booker did not serve the function that purported to re-
quire extraordinary dispatch.
Admittedly, my critique of the lower courts' procedural actions
is not wholly disjoined from my view of the merits. The Seventh
Circuit's haste, and that of other courts, partly owes to certain
judges' belief that Blakely clearly and obviously held the Guide-
lines unconstitutional-a belief I do not share. 39 Yet even those
335. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97.
336. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003); United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625 (2002).
337. Booker, 375 F.3d at 510.
338. Id. at 514.
339. See supra Part III.A.
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courts' appraisal of the merits may have been influenced by the
uncommon speed of the process, which also compressed the liti-
gants ability to prepare. Complexities often seem simpler when
time is short.
Two other motives bear note. First, Judge Posner expressed
apparent interest in forcing constitutional questions regarding
the Guidelines into the Supreme Court,34° and the Second Cir-
cuit's certification decision manifests similar sentiments.34' It is
certainly rare for judges to push their cases onto the Supreme
Court's docket, and, indeed, one may doubt whether they should.
The modern shift toward discretionary certiorari jurisdiction (as
opposed to appeals of right) incorporates a congressional policy
that the Supreme Court should have broad authority and discre-
tion to determine its own caseload.342 Naturally, there are rare
circumstances that require lower courts to act quickly in response
to exigent circumstances.343 But Booker did not present such cir-
cumstances any more than did Apprendi itself.
The desire for quick review more likely stemmed from a sense
among lower appellate courts that Blakely's silence regarding the
Guidelines left unfinished business that the Supreme Court
should have addressed. If any appellate judges truly sought to aid
the Supreme Court in accomplishing its work, however, they ig-
nored that previous cases in the federal system had for several
years generated ample certiorari petitions raising that issue. The
Supreme Court needed no further help.
More probably, the appellate courts were subtly criticizing the
Court's narrow approach in Blakely. Judge Posner must have
known that his opinion might cause significant controversy and
might encourage other courts to decide quickly, perhaps agree-
340. Booker, 375 F.3d at 510 ("We cannot of course provide definitive guidance; only the
Court and Congress can do that; our hope is that an early opinion will help speed the issue
to a definitive resolution."); id. at 513 ("If our decision is wrong, may the Supreme Court
speedily reverse it."); cf id. at 521 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision will dis-
combobulate the whole criminal-law docket. I trust that our superiors will have something
to say about this. Soon.").
341. Peneranda, 375 F.3d at 238.
342. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1552-55 (5th ed. 2003) (outlining the historical development and purposes of cer-
tiorari jurisdiction).
343. See generally McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (addressing
the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 in the year before an
election, despite significant delay by the three-judge district court).
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ably, to his approach. The quick release of the Seventh Circuit's
opinion assured its position as an intellectual and political re-
source for other judges inclined to invalidate the Guidelines. The
more judges to follow the Seventh Circuit's approach invalidating
the Guidelines, the quicker the Court would have to act, and in-
deed, that scenario is just what happened.3"
Another potential factor in some judges' decisions might be
their antipathy toward the Guidelines, which limit judicial power
and often require extraordinarily harsh sentences. As one com-
mentator put it: "The most public, steady, and compelling criti-
cism of the guidelines has come from federal judges .... Judges
[have spoken] early and often about their displeasure with the
sentencing rules."345 Although Judges Bright, Lay, and Merritt
have been vocal, well-recognized critics of sentencing policy for
years,346 it is not evident that any other appellate judge involved
344. See supra Parts II.A, III.B.2.
345. Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 1211, 1236 (2004); accord STITH & CABRANES, supra note 20, at 5 n.12 (collecting
dozens of sources where "Uludges have published... articles, essays, and letters that ex-
press deep criticism of the Guidelines regime").
346. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 336 F.3d 760, 768 (8th Cir. 2003) (Bright, J., dis-
senting) (urging judges to "[1]et your opinions disclose[ I . .. the injustice in the sentencing
... decisions you are obligated to impose by Congressional mandate and/or the Sentencing
Guidelines," and declaring that "the time has come for major reform in the system"); id. at
766 n.7 & 768 (quoting nine other opinions exemplifying Judge Bright's criticism of guide-
line sentencing); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1525-30 (6th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Guidelines' "relevant conduct" rule vio-
lates separation of powers, the right against self-incrimination, and rights to notice, grand
jury indictment, and confrontation of witnesses); United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 413
(8th Cir. 1992) (Lay, J., dissenting) (noting "the fundamental fairness missing from the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Unless Congress and the Sentencing Commission intend
to abandon the Constitution of the United States altogether, [the combination of Fifth and
Sixth Amendment objections] points up one of the more fundamental weaknesses inherent
in the application by district courts of the Sentencing Guidelines."); United States. v.
Baker, 961 F.2d 1390, 1393 (8th Cir. 1992) (Bright, J., concurring) ("This case is another
example of rigid guidelines producing inequity and injustice in sentencing, and demon-
strates a need for the reformation, if not the abolishment, of Guideline sentencing.");
United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 513, 515 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting)
(criticizing mandatory Guidelines as "a prescription for injustice because district judges
can no longer prevent the imposition of inappropriately harsh sentences," and predicting
that "such a rigid system of sentencing can only end in failure because it gives one side in
the competitive process too much power"), overruled in part by Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81 (1996); Donald P. Lay, Judge Myron Bright, 83 MINN. L. REV. 225, 227 (1998)
("[Judge Bright] shares a common disdain with Judge Heaney and me for the inequities
and harsh sentences that have evolved from the United States Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines."); Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J.
1755, 1761-62 (1992) ("[T]he guidelines continue to increase the number of men and
women incarcerated in our federal prisons, resulting in abhorrent social and economic
costs.... [They] have done nothing more than provide a negative contribution to a serious
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with post-Blakely decisions has strong views about the Guide-
lines. Much less could one suggest that such predilections affected
any court's decision about timing or otherwise. My more limited
point is that appearances often matter, and, if the Guidelines are
upheld, the speed and merits of the recent court of appeals' deci-
sions could be reexamined in a critical light. The possibility of
that reexamination, combined with the ample opportunity that
existed for more measured consideration, recommended a more
patient approach allowing appellate and certiorari practice to run
at a more normal pace.
The Guidelines' constitutionality raises issues of uncommon
importance and complexity. A shortened time frame reduces the
institutional resources that judges and litigants can bring to bear,
and although justice delayed has familiar disadvantages, the cur-
rent rush to judgment may also be less than ideal.
Thus far, we have imagined that the Booker Court were to up-
hold the Guidelines. On the opposite assumption-that the Court
were to invalidate the Guidelines-two other actors' behavior
comes into focus. One is the federal government, whose litigation
tactics unintentionally fed the post-Blakely frenzy. Of particular
note is the government's decision to support the State of Wash-
ington as an amicus curiae, and the government's gratuitous pre-
diction that, if Washington lost Blakely, "[i]t is ... not certain
that this Court would ultimately conclude that the differences be-
tween the Washington system and the federal Guidelines are of
constitutional magnitude."347 Such words seem mild in the ab-
stract, but to the Booker Court, they risk signaling a self-fulfilled
societal problem."); Gilbert S. Merritt, A Straightforward Proposal To Reform Sentencing
Guidelines, 5 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 233, 234 (1993) (proposing change in order to "create a
fairer, less harsh system that reintroduces rehabilitation and flexibility"); see also, e.g.,
JoLee Adamich et al., The Selected Cases of Myron H. Bright: Thirty Years of His Juris-
prudence, 83 MINN. L. REV. 239, 259-60 (1998) ("Judge Bright has been a regular and vo-
cal critic of the Guidelines, particularly with respect to their application in the context of
non-violent drug-related offenses .... Judge Bright's criticism has been frank and open."
(footnote omitted)); Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men: The Sentencing Judge's
Dilemma, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 841 n.17 (1998) ("Donald Lay, a senior circuit
judge, has criticized the federal sentencing guidelines extensively in print. Lay faults the
commission for its severity, its rigidity, its failure to consult with judges, and for straying
from its congressional mandate . . ").
347. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 29-30,
Blakely (No. 02-1632); see also id. at 9 ("[Ilt is uncertain whether [any] distinctions would
be sufficient if this Court applied Apprendi here, since the United States Sentencing
Guidelines have the force and effect of law, and it is theoretically possible to calculate a
guidelines sentence based on the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.").
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forecast of defeat. No appraisal of Blakely's litigation tactics can
escape the distortions of hindsight, but the jury-authorization
theory in Part IV and the doctrinal analysis in Part III suggest
that the government could have kept its powder dry, or at least
could have used different language to mitigate risks that a loss in
Blakely would seem unduly important for the Court in Booker.
A final institution warranting attention is the Supreme Court
itself, and in particular its practice regarding petitions of certio-
rari. The Court's decisions regarding certiorari often escape at-
tention, but those decisions should be subject to significant criti-
cism if Booker holds the Guidelines unconstitutional. As
discussed previously, the Court has for years denied the petitions
of federal defendants who sought to challenge the Guidelines on
Apprendi grounds.34 If those denials caused thousands of defen-
dants to be sentenced under an unconstitutional scheme, and
caused thousands of other defendants (as appeals became final) to
forego any challenge to such sentences, then the Court's consis-
tent refusal to grant certiorari would seem hard to understand.349
Perhaps the best explanation for the Court's pre-Blakely deni-
als of certiorari is that one or more Justices were at the time un-
certain about the Guidelines' constitutional status. Absent a cir-
cuit conflict, the Court is often justified in avoiding questions,
even important ones, where the Justices are unsure of the result.
When certiorari was granted in Blakely, however, the landscape
changed. Similarities between the content of Washington's sys-
tem and the Guidelines illustrated that the Guidelines constitu-
tionality could be implicated, and the possibility of avoiding the
question became increasingly remote. At the time certiorari was
granted and while Blakely was pending, the Court had ample op-
portunity to grant certiorari in a federal companion case, which
would have directly raised the Guidelines' constitutionality, if the
Court believed that the nonstatutory Guidelines and Washing-
348. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
349. The Supreme Court often does not grant certiorari unless the decisions of two or
more lower courts conflict-which did not occur until after Booker was decided. See supra
note 159 and accompanying text. The Court's preference to hear cases of interjurisdic-
tional conflict is by no means a hard and fast rule, however. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified
School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2305 (2004) (granting certiorari, despite the ab-
sence of any circuit conflict, to review the Pledge of Allegiance's constitutionality, an issue
of "obvious importance"). And, without more, that preference should not have stopped the
Court from hearing one of the hundreds of Guidelines cases that passed through the
docket after Apprendi.
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ton's statutes walked in constitutional lockstep.5 ° Just as the
Blakely Court could have avoided authoring its suggestive lan-
guage regarding statutory maxima if it planned to uphold the
Guidelines,5 1 there was no reason for the Court to be so coy in its
certiorari practice if that same language was (as other commenta-
tors believe) intended to spell the Guidelines' doom.
Although the discussion in this Part uses alternate hypotheses
as a narrative technique to highlight the conduct of different enti-
ties, most of the institutional lessons that emerge are independ-
ent of what the Court ultimately decides in Booker."2 For exam-
ple, a more restrained judicial role would be commendable for the
dissenting justices and the courts of appeals regardless of
whether their substantive analysis proves correct and the Guide-
lines are struck down. Similarly, the government's Blakely brief
could have been more moderate regardless of the result in Booker.
By placing too many eggs in Blakely's basket, the government
may have jeopardized its efforts to distinguish the Guidelines
from Washington's failed statutory system.
The disruption that arose from Blakely to Booker derives from
a combination of actions undertaken by various repeat players in
the federal judicial system, in a context where the Court's juris-
prudence was so recent and dynamic that tentativeness would
have been appropriate. The dissenters' strong rhetoric and Jus-
tice O'Connor's public comments initiated a media spectacle; the
lower federal courts, led by their most prominent judge, immedi-
ately validated those fears; and government lawyers continued to
350. A different rationale that sometimes justifies the Court's decision not to grant cer-
tiorari is allowing the issue to percolate in the United States courts of appeals, so that the
Court may reach its own conclusions with the benefit of other judges' assessments. Such
reasoning would ring hollow here, because, just as the Court has received numerous peti-
tions for certiorari, it also has received reasoned decisions on this issue from every circuit.
See supra note 41. The only new question is how the courts of appeals should react to the
ambiguities of the Blakely opinion. Because that question lies within the Supreme Court's
unique competence, it is hard to see much benefit in gaining outside judges' interpreta-
tions of the Court's own language and subtext.
351. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99.
352. The Supreme Court's certiorari practice is an exception. As discussed supra Part
III.C.1, if Booker strikes down the Guidelines, then the Court's denials of certiorari seem
highly questionable. On the other hand, if Booker upholds the Guidelines, there is nothing
unseemly about the Court's decision to wait until an appropriate federal case arose.
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litigate, trying to ignore the United States's line in the sand that
was drawn (and stepped over) in Blakely.353
Other courts, commentators, and practitioners have now joined
the fray, and discussions have largely turned to what should hap-
pen after the Court invalidates the Guidelines, with less attention
to whether the Court should do so, and if so why. This Article has
analyzed both of those latter questions, but in doing so, it has also
suggested that the chaotic events since Blakely do not derive from
inevitable natural forces. They are a product of interrelated insti-
tutional choices, many of which stretched or exceeded the limits
of the relevant actors' proper role. To recognize the existence and
importance of such decisions may be the first step toward discuss-
ing the most suitable ways to cope with perennial problems of in-
complete constitutional rules and undertheorized Supreme Court
decisions, both of which Blakely illustrates." 4
It might seem unfortunate that the constitutionality of the
Guidelines, and in many respects the future of federal criminal
law, must now be decided under such turbulent and accelerated
circumstances, and the chain of post-Blakely events reveals how
some participants in the federal appellate system could have
ameliorated the crisis. That illustration, in turn, identifies the
importance of adherence to institutional roles in our system of
constitutional rule making.
353. But cf King & Klein, supra note 4, at 320 (presenting anecdotal evidence that
"[s]ome prosecutors may not vigorously defend the [Department of Justice's] position...
that Blakely does not apply" to the Guidelines).
354. The work of two eminent scholars confirms such projects' abiding importance. Pro-
fessor Cass Sunstein has argued for a theory of "minimalism," under which the Supreme
Court does and should decide cases "narrowly" and "shallowly." See generally SUNSTEIN,
supra note 319; Cass R. Sunstein, The Smallest Court in the Land, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2004, at 9. The difficulty with such judicial methodologies is that they create the sorts of
theoretical and administrative gaps that have caused such problems in the Blakely con-
text.
Similarly, Professor Bickel drew attention to the Court's ability to avoid deciding certain
difficult questions using jurisdictional and technical maneuvers, including manipulation of
certiorari practice, that he grouped under the name passive virtues. See ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
111-83 (2d ed. 1986). See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term,
75 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961). The questions raised in the text suggest that similar issues
arise for other federal courts, and that the virtues and vices of passivity, action, minimal-
ism, and maximalism vary significantly with context. A general theory of such variations
has not been developed.
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V. CONCLUSION
At the very least, the path from Blakely to Booker has made for
captivating judicial theater. The current scene has three main
characters. One is Justice Stevens, Apprendi's author and archi-
tect, for whom the Sentencing Revolution embodies a longstand-
ing opposition to mandatory minima355 and a broad concern for
robust and fair criminal procedures.356 Second is Justice Stephen
Breyer, who drafted and defended the Guidelines as an original
member of the Sentencing Commission. The Guidelines constitute
his most significant product to date and a major part of his legacy
in American law. Third is Justice Scalia, Blakely's author, who
will decide which of his colleagues prevails. For Justice Scalia,
Booker presents a jurisprudential tension. He has long opposed
the Guidelines on separation of powers grounds,357 yet similar
separation of powers principles might recommend upholding
those Guidelines against Fifth and Sixth Amendment chal-
lenges.358 Justice Scalia authored Blakely, which has been cred-
ited (and blamed) with threatening the Guidelines, but he is also
well-known for seeking simple rules. The jury-authorization the-
ory would provide such a rule, and also would avoid propelling
courts into detailed substantive oversight of criminal law.
Of course, we cannot know what will happen. But it is impor-
tant that neither the intra-Court drama, nor the immense social
and political consequences in the balance, should submerge the
basic constitutional questions presented, questions that merit
more careful theoretical and doctrinal analysis than they have re-
ceived. This Article has sought to show that the most important
355. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 95-103 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
356. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32-35 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a "three-strikes" sentence under California violates Eighth Amendment
standards of proportionality); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits prolonged use of a "hitching post" to restrain convicts); At-
kins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded
criminals is unconstitutional); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 179-84 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment requires courts to investigate conflicts of
interest of which they reasonably should have known).
357. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
358. For a similar dilemma that Justice Scalia confronted in applying Apprendi to the
Arizona death penalty, see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring), and supra note 193.
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issue remains unanswered after Blakely: Whether nonstatutory
sentencing rules are constitutionally regulated by Apprendi. Its
theory of Apprendi rights, which is consistent with discretionary
sentencing, which has historically granted judges the authority to
control actual punishment and with legislative primacy to define
crimes and their maximum punishment, stands as an open chal-
lenge for future interpretations of Apprendi.59 Whether the Court
in Booker, or academics thereafter, will meet that challenge re-
mains to be seen.
359. Cf Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (chastising Apprendi's dis-
senters for their failure to produce a "coherent alternative").
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